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Abstract. After 1990, at the close of the communist era, Russia’s agriculture embraced an ample 
process of transformation. The transition from centralized agriculture to a modern, competitive and 
sustainable agriculture was marked by several reform failures. Nonetheless, the Eurasian country's 
agro-food sector and in particular the grain industry thrived remarkably after 2014 in the wake of 
the Western countries-imposed sanctions on Russia in response to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. 
In fact, Russia's policymakers recognized Kremlin's decision to impose complete food imports ban 
on the EU, US and some other Western countries as an opportunity to re-launch the agro-food 
sector. At present, the government seizes the sector's economic potential also as a strategy for 
economic diversification of the country, which is too much tied up to the oil and gas industry 
performances. In fact, in the Putin era the establishment of integrated agricultural holdings was 
supported by well-balanced agricultural reforms that had an important role for the modernization of 
Russia’s grain industry. In this regard, the main purpose of this paper is to analyse the agro-food 
policies developed by the Russian government, the reasons behind the success of Russia’s grain 
industry in the Middle East and North Africa regions (the so-called MENA countries) and the 
weaknesses it still confronts, both internal and external. 
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Introduction 
The economic relevance of the agro-food1 sector is increasing worldwide. For 
example, within the economies of the European Union Member States (EU and MS 
respectively), the agro-food sector has a great socio-economic relevance: more than 500 
million of EU citizens enjoy one of the highest quality food supplies at affordable prices. 
The agro-food sector represents roughly 44 million of jobs (4.0% of EU Gross Domestic 
Product - GDP). In 2020 EU agro-food trade (exports plus imports) reached a value of 
€253.7 billion (i.e. 0.3% more than in 2019). EU27 exports increased by 0.5% compared to 
2019, reaching €151.8 billion. EU27 imports attained €102 billion, just 0.1% higher than 
2019 (EU Commission, 2020). Surprisingly, agriculture has a poor relevance within the 
political agenda of several nations. This is mostly observed when policymakers are 
required to establish a strategy or a security system as both are considered military 
concerns. In many countries the only area where agriculture is closely linked to security is 
that of “food security”: a sector which is independent from the national defence system 
(Bassou, 2016). 
Few countries (among these the USA) have clearly identified the agro-food sector as 
a key area in terms of national security. For example, in 2016 when the Chinese giant 
ChemChina proposed to buy the agro-chemical manufacturer Syngenta ($43 billion in cash: 
the biggest acquisition abroad ever done by a Chinese group), the USA senators asked the 
Treasury Department to analyse the Chinese proposal against “potential consequences for 
the USA national security agro-food sector” (Bassou, 2016). In the last twenty years, USA's 
 
1 Agrifood sector shall be intended as the set of different stages in the agricultural production of food: from 
production to processing, trading, distribution, and consumption. Literally “from field to fork”. This set also 
includes the grain sector. 
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defence doctrine, stability and world-governance are dependent on food security; thus, the 
USA's agro-food sector issues are closely related to domestic and foreign policies. 
Russia’s agro-food system and in particular its grain industry, after re-emerging from 
the significant setback triggered by the disintegration of the Soviet Union (hereinafter 
USSR) in 1991, plays an important role within the national economy accounting for 4% of 
the national GDP. It is also one of the largest sources of employment in the country (10% 
of the working population is employed in this sector). It is a strategy that challenges the 
standpoint of many experts who associate Russia’s geo-economic power merely with the 
arms and oil/gas sectors’ performance. Currently, the Eurasian country retains the title of 
the world’s largest wheat exporter. Needless to say, its trade relations have great influence 
on several strategic areas. For instance, Russia’s economic relationships with the Middle 
East and North Africa regions (MENA countries2: mainly Egypt, Turkey3, Libya and Syria) 
depend on the Russian wheat production as well. This study aims to evaluating the impact 
of the agro-food policies on Russia’s international relationships and thus their influence 
within this fluid geopolitical context. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional background of 
Russia, and it provides also an overview of the Eurasian country’s foreign policies. Section 
3 describes the main economic issues of the Russian Federation. Section 4 provides an 
overview of Russia’s (officially The Russian Federation) agro-food policies evolution with 
a special insight into the food policies adopted in the Communist era. Section 5 reports an 
analytical insight into the evolution of Russia’s diplomatic influence in the Middle-East. 
Section 6 will analyse the main aspects of Moscow's growing relevance as key player in the 
grain markets of the MENA region. Section 7 concludes with caveats as regards the 
author’s interpretations. 
 
Russia institutional context and political environment  
 
 A strong executive 
Understanding Russia's key domestic issues is valuable for the analysis of its 
geopolitical approach in the agro-food international context. Domestic politics influences 
the geopolitics processes and their outcomes; thus the importance to explore the dominant 
changes and trends of Russia’s political environment in the last 30 years.   
The economic results of the main economic sectors, including the agro-food sector, 
were notably affected by Russia’s governmental political decisions and strategies. After 
the “Yeltsin period” (July 1991-December 1999), President Putin gradually concentrated 
the power in the presidency. He consolidated the political authority’s vertical line by 
reorganizing the federal and regional governments (Oliker et al., 2009). Since the early 
2000s an important component of Kremlin’s ideology was the “sovereign democracy”4, 
which encompasses mainly the following principles: (a) the sovereignty of Russia above 
 
2The Middle East was a Eurocentric term forged sometime during the 19th century referring to a trans-
continental area between North Africa (Egypt) and South West Asia. International organizations such as the 
World Bank and UNICEF use more specific terms such as MENA to refer to the region spanning 
horizontally from Morocco to Iran. 
3Depending on the definition, Turkey is considered either part of MENA or just outside of MENA 
(geographically). However, for the purposes of this report it is helpful to include Turkey in all the 
discussions regarding MENA.   
4For Surkov, sovereign democracy is: “A society's political life where the political powers and decisions are 
decided by a diverse Russian nation for the purpose of reaching material welfare, freedom and fairness by 
all citizens, social groups and nationalities, by the people that formed it”. 
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all; and (b) material well-being. This process reduced the checks and balances within the 
Russian political system; furthermore, several changes within the parliament and the 
judiciary and regional governments shaped Moscow’s decision-process as highly 
centralized (Frolov et al., 2006). 
 
Russian regional government and legislative power structure 
From the mid-1980s until 19915 there were several changes in the structure of the 
Soviet Federal States, whereas: (a) in 1998 a Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies was 
established in each republic; (b) for the first time elections to these bodies presented voters 
with a choice of candidates including non-communists representatives. Several events 
brought to the establishment of the Russian Federation: (a) in June 1990 the Russian 
Congress proclaimed the supremacy of Russia’s law over the USSR laws; (b) in June 1991 
Yeltsin became the first president democratically elected; (c) in August 1991 an abortive 
coup by hard-liners opposing Gorbachev’s reforms led to the collapse of the USSR 
governmental organizations and the abolition of the Communist Party’s leading role in the 
government6. Russia’s administrative structure differed significantly from the USSR. The 
tensions between the executive and legislative powers became dramatic in 1993 when 
President Yeltsin dissolved the Russian Parliament. Since then, there was a strengthening 
of presidential powers with many legislative acts supporting this decision (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 - Russia's main constitutional changes 






December 12, 1993, 3/5 of Russian voters ratified the new constitution proposed by Yeltsin, and representatives were 
elected to a new legislature. The president shall be elected in a national vote and cannot serve more than two terms 
consecutively. The president is vested with significant powers. The president is also commander in chief of the armed 
forces and can declare martial law or a state of emergency. The president (whether the legislature fails to pass the 








Extension of the presidential term from 4 to 6 years (2008). With the enactment of the new constitution the Federal 
Assembly7 became the country’s legislative body. The president’s nominee of the prime minister is subject to the 
approval by the State Duma. The president has the (pivotal) power of dissolving the State Duma and call for new 
elections if the Duma rejects a nominee three times or passes a vote of no confidence twice in three months. All 
legislation must first pass the State Duma before considered by the Federation Council; Presidential veto can be 
overridden by the legislature with a 2/3 majority, or a bill may be altered to incorporate presidential reservations and 
pass with a majority of vote. With a 2/3 majority (and approval by the Russian Constitutional Court), the legislature 




Putin 7 May 
2018 – to date 
 
On 15 January President Putin announced plans to overhaul the Constitution. The most important change was added 
by a surprise last-minute amendment, which stated that Putin’s previous presidencies should not count towards the 
two-term limit, thus opening the door to his remaining in power for 12 more years after his fourth presidency ends in 
2024. Apart from this, the amendments revising 42 of 137 articles, fall into four main groups, concerning: (a) the role of 
Russia’s political institutions; (b) Russian sovereignty; (c) socio-economic benefits, (d) values. Putin’s January 2020 
speech already contained an outline of the main proposals in the first three groups, but the amendments on values 
were all abided subsequently by the State Duma. 
 
President Putin created seven districts above the regional level to increase the central 
governmental power over the Region. Furthermore, Moscow’s strategy on the problems 
with separatism and Islamic militancy in the Caucasus region brought to the 
establishment of eight-federal districts in 2010. The Constitution, reporting legal 
 
5The period of Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika (restructuring), glasnost (openness) and demokratizatsiya 
(democratization) reform policies. 
6Republic after republic declared its sovereignty; in December, when the USSR was formally dissolved, 
Russia was established as an independent country. 
7The Federal Assembly consists of: (a) the Federation Council (an upper house comprising appointed 
representatives from each of Russia’s administrative divisions); (b) the State Duma (a 450-members 
popularly elected lower house).   
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provisions that guide the Sub-National governments (SONGs), guarantees the principle of 
self-government. “Federal Law8” also stated legal relationships among the central and 
peripheral government. Although the central government retained significantly its 
authority, peripheral government bodies attained some powers: (a) regions may adopt 
their legislation on local self-government if agreeable with federal legislation; (b) local 
authorities may carry out public services of local interest9. The Russian Federation is 
divided in 83 regions with various degrees of autonomy. Figure 1 shows the main outlines 
of territorial organization/sub-national government responsibilities. 
 
Figure 1 – Territorial organization and sub-national government responsibilities 
 
Source: OECD, 2016. 
 
The establishment of the controversial 9th district in 2014 following the annexation of 
the Ukrainian autonomous Republic of Crimea was a significant and strategic geopolitical 
move for Russia whereas: 
 
1. Under past agreements Ukraine allowed Russia to keep its ships in Crimea (after the fall 
of the USSR), but preventing additional Russian vessels from being added. This changed 
after the Maidan protest10 movement in Kiev. As a pro-Western government formed in 
Ukraine the Kremlin was no longer sure that the agreements on Crimea would be 
honoured. The fleet’s capabilities changed profoundly after the annexation. Moscow 
diverted resources to renovating the fleet, and Sevastopol is now a major hub of Russia’s 
military and geo-economic power projection. 
2. With the control on Crimea Russia acquired a dominant position across the Black Sea 
region. With Crimea's central position in the Black Sea the Russian navy can control from 
Sevastopol all the approaches and dominate the region vis-a-vis Turkey11 (Kingwell, 2016). 
 
8 The 2003 Federal Law 131-FZ on the General Principles of Local Self-Government determines the main 
areas falling within the jurisdiction of the Federation, the regions (regional transport) and shared 
competences (minority rights, environment, health, education, science, culture, labour law, social security, 
family law, and natural disasters). 
9The public services of local interest can be listed as follows: education, public health, public order and 
safety, land use planning, social protection-employment, local economic-development, environmental 
protection, public utilities (local energy, waste), local roads and public transport. 
10A wave of demonstrations in Ukraine, which began on the night of 21 November 2013 with protests in 
Maidan Square in Kiev, were sparked by the Ukrainian government's decision to suspend the signing of an 
association agreement with the European Union instead of choosing to hold closer ties to Russia and the 
Eurasian Economic Union. The protests’ scope soon widened, calling for the resignation of President Viktor 
Yanukovych and his government. The protests were fuelled by the perception of "widespread government 
corruption", "abuse of power", and "violation of human rights" in Ukraine. The situation escalated after the 
violent dispersal of protesters on 30 November leading to many more protesters joining. The protests led to 
the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. 
11This approach was enshrined in the latest draft of Russia's national naval doctrine released in July 2015. 
The document envisions a reinvigorated presence in the Black Sea, allowing Russian ships to reestablish lost 
footholds in the southern Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea, and through the Suez Canal. In the document, 
Russia says its aim is to wield influence abroad and resist NATO encroachment. 
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3. Sevastopol acts currently as a forwarding operating base supported in the background 
by Novorossiysk (Figure 2). Transport ships from the Black Sea Fleet are still used 
to deliver goods from Novorossiysk to the Russian naval facility in Tartus on the Syrian 
Coast crossing through the Bosporus Strait. This route is a vital line of supply for Russia's 
military operation in Syria (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 - The strategic position of Sevastopol as commercial conjunction allowing transport 
goods from continental Russia through the Black sea towards the Mediterranean Sea (Europe and   
MENA Countries) 
 
Note: The blue line indicates the transport route of agro-food and industrial commodities from Russia through the Black 
Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
4. The Sevastopol port has also a strategic commercial relevance for Russia. Moscow’s 
agro-food companies can transport considerable amount of goods (including wheat and 
other cereals) towards the MENA countries; in February 2019, a trade agreement was 
signed between the Sevastopol Port Authority and the Syrian Port Authority of the Tartus 
harbor. The agreement dealt with transshipment of several goods such as food, grains, 
building materials, etc., through the ports of Tartus and Sevastopol. This Crimea’s 
territorial claim was not recognized by Ukraine and most other countries; nevertheless, 
Russia exercises de facto control of the region. 
 
Russian multifaceted foreign relations 
 
Most powerful countries' foreign policies make complementary use of political, 
economic, military, and cultural cooperation tools and conduct diplomacy that thinks 
globally and acts in almost every corner of the world. The current Russian foreign policies 
are not an exception. The Eurasian country's foreign policy in the early years of the post-
Soviet era has been largely influenced by the pro-Western representatives and by their 
close diplomatic relationship with NATO and the EU. However, due to several diplomatic 
fallouts the cooperation between the Russian Federation and most Western institutions 
froze significantly. Since the establishment of the country Russia’s foreign policies can be 
divided into two main periods, which are described below: 
1. Pro-Western foreign policies. Since 1991 Russia’s foreign policies were influenced by 
pro-Western representatives and its diplomatic relationship with NATO. Pro-Western 
representatives wished to integrate Russia’s economic system with the Western countries’ 
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economies. The first president of the new-born Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin stated that 
“NATO membership could have been a long-term political aim of Russia”. Thus, after the 
USSR’s collapse, the foreign policies aimed to ensure “democratization” of the newly 
formed post-communist countries and guarantee a stable Europe (Roache, 2019). In 1994, 
Russia signed an official agreement with NATO, offering its collaboration at building trust 
between NATO and other former Soviet countries. However, problems started with 
NATO's request for Russia to uphold democracy and human rights (McFaul, 1999). The 
relationship became even more problematic after NATO refused a Moscow's request 
(Roache, 2019). By 1999, when it became clear that NATO and Russia had irreconcilable 
views over the future of the post-Soviet Republics, this potential alliance turned into a 
security challenge (Garcevic, 2017). 
2. New approach of Russia’s foreign policies. Since 2008, the conflicting relationship 
between Russia and Western international institutions (namely NATO and the EU 
Commission) is marking a continuous increase: (a) in April 2008, NATO promised 
membership12 to Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest summit, but a membership plan 
was not offered; (b) in August 2008 Russia started a five day invasion to defend the 
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Figure 3); (c) South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia later declared their independence and Russia is one of the few countries in the 
world to recognize it; (d) in March 2014 Russia sent troops to annex Crimea from Ukraine. 
This military action started on February 2014 and ended on March 6 with the declaration 
of Crimea’s independence. Since the pro-Russian government was established in Crimea, 
the south-east part of Ukraine remains an unsafe conflict zone (Roache, 2019). 
 
Figure 3– Map of Russo-Georgian War 
 
Source: Wikimedia Foundation 
 
After Crimea’s conquest, Western nations imposed severe economic sanctions on 
Russia. Thus, Moscow engaged in trade retaliation introducing (on 7th August 2014) a 
specific import ban on a range of product categories (beef, dairy products, fruits and 
 
12 More information on this topic: Brunnstrom D., Cornwell S., NATO promises Ukraine, Georgia entry one day 




vegetables) originating from USA, EU, Canada, and Australia. Of Russia’s US$39 billion 
worth of agro-food imports during 2013, US$23.5 billion were in the product categories 
affected by this ban (FAO, 2014). The import bans fueled food prices reducing food 
availability, as demonstrated by the inflation rise since 2014 (Figure 4) (Liefert and Liefert, 
2015). 
 
Figure 4 - Yearly inflation in Russia since 1995 
 
Source: Statista, 2019. Note: The statistic shows the inflation rate in Russia 2004-2018, with projections up until 2024.  
 
An example of Russia’s “multifaceted” foreign relation, which also regards the 
interface between geopolitics and agriculture, is that with Turkey. In November 2015 
Turkey shot down a Russian warplane on its border with Syria, which opened a severe 
diplomatic crisis between the two countries. With a president Putin’s decree of November 
2015, Russia banned Turkish agricultural imports and hiring Turkish nationals; the ban 
lasted almost one year starting from 1st January 2016 to the beginning of 2017 (Kingwell et 
al., 2016). However, after a quick recovery of the bilateral relations, both countries rapidly 
increased military13 and economic cooperation. These issues show that the Russian 
government is prepared to exercise its powers in many ways that affect its economy, 
including the agro-industry. Often the interests of any sector, including the grains 
industry, are subservient to the emphasis that the Russian government places on 
geopolitics and food security. Indeed, market forces alone are not the main determinant of 
changes in Russia. Rather it is the policy decisions of the Russian government that can 
leave short and long term imprints on the regional growth and the profitability of various 






13More information regarding the reshaped bilateral relationships between the Russian Federation and 






An overview of Russian main economic aspects  
 
The relevance of geography on the Russian economy 
A stable macroeconomic and political environment is a key element to foster a 
balanced economic and financial system, as it is easier for economic agents to assess the 
risks and returns associated with financial activities. If the political and financial-economic 
volatility are excessively high, financial markets and foreign investors are unlikely to 
provide long-finance at a reasonable premium, as well as economic support to carry out 
entrepreneurial investments (World Bank, 2015). The Russian Federation was not an 
exception. Its institutional and financial-economic context was characterized by a high 
degree of volatility and uncertainly considering that the government implemented radical 
reforms aiming to transform a vast central planned economy to an economy based on 
capitalist principles. Certainly, this quick shift led to an unstable trend of the Russian 
economic sectors, including the agro-food sector.  
The analysis of Russia’s geopolitics and agro-food policies must consider the 
country’s size. Wideness has always been both an advantage and a disadvantage for the 
development of the Russian policies at all levels (Bezrukov and Sushentsov, 2015). While 
covering the largest land mass on earth can be an advantage in terms of potential areas of 
influence that can come under Russian control, the country’s socio-economic context has 
always been affected by: (a) huge distances between cities worsened by a lack of 
communication lines (due to insufficient investments in infrastructures); (b) the absence of 
natural barriers against enemies; (c) harsh climate in many areas, which affects also the 
socio-economic conditions of the populations living in those areas. These issues may affect 
the government’s action in terms of proper delivery of essential services (energy supply, 
equal level of education, healthcare’s standards, and security in all areas). Russia’s 
complex socio-economic context was smoothly depicted by Vladimir Solovyov (2015), who 
stated that “geography is the stepmother of the Russian history”. Figure 5 (which includes 
Russian climate zones) shows how truthful is this statement.  
 
Figure 5 – Köppen Russian climate zones  
 
Source: Climate zones calculated from data WorldClim.org 
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Being the largest country in the world also implies several advantages. Indeed, 
Russia is one of the richest countries in terms of natural resources. From Kaliningrad to 
Vladivostok (total distance of 10,317 km) the country holds a huge amount of different raw 
materials (oil, gas, timber, copper, diamonds, zinc, bauxite, nickel, uranium). Within such 
a vast quantity of strategic economic assets, agro-food commodities also play an important 
role. 
 
Economic outline of Russian Federation 
Since the establishment of the Russian Federation as an independent political and 
juridical entity in 1991, the country's economic performances showed a fluctuating trend, 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. Transition period. The first decade of transition from centrally planned economy to 
market economy was hard-hitting for Russia. GDP fell from $516 billion in 1990 to $196 
billion in 1999: a significant plunge of over 60%. To tackle the economic turmoil (following 
the IMF recommendations) the government privatized many Russian industries during 
the 1990s (except for the energy and defence sectors). 
2. Financial crises. The devaluation in 1998 (after the financial crisis) and the 
uninterrupted upward trend of oil prices from 1999 to 2008 propelled the Russian 
economy (based on its energy sector exports) to grow at an annual average rate of 7% 
(Figure 6) (Frigoli, 2009). 
 
Figure 6 - Russia: Real GDP, annual percentage change, 1990–2018 and IMF forecast for 2021–
2025 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2019. 
 
The 2008-2009 global financial crisis plunged Russia’s economy of 7.8% in 2009 as oil 
prices plummeted and foreign credit dried up (Figure 6) (Moiseev et al., 2019). However, 
the government and the Central Bank timely responded to ring fence key economic sectors 
(such as the banking sector) from the effects of the crisis. Russian economy began to grow 
again and increased of 4.5%, 4.3% and 3.4% in 2010, 2011, and 2012. Thus, the country paid 
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back in advance the debts taken out with the Paris Club14, and accumulated large reserves 
in currency before slowing down to 1.3% in 2013 and 0.6% in 2014 (Frigoli, 2009 and Focus 
Economics, 2020). Indeed, the Russian economy in 2014 experienced two major shocks 
with a modest growth of 0.6% (Figure 6) due to: (a) the sharp decline in oil prices during 
the third and fourth quarter of 2014, which exposed Russia’s extreme dependence on 
global commodity cycles15; (b) the double combination of a nearly 75% drop in the price of 
oil and Western sanctions imposed in 2014 (after the Ukrainian dramatic events). Both 
caused a strong economic recession. The collapse of the "rouble" and the inflation’s soaring 
forced the government to dig deep into its international reserves to keep the banking 
sector afloat (Russel, 2019). Partly helped by a recovery in the oil price, the economy 
started growing moderately again in late 2016. 
3. Slow recovery. Both years 2017 and 2018 displayed a limited GDP growth. In 2019, the 
Russian GDP was just 1.3% year-on-year, which is well below even the most cautious 
forecast (Figure 6). The boost that this growth is supposed to obtain from the RUB 25.7 
trillion ($417bn) investments (planned for 13 national projects) is still at least two years 
away and the administration is still arguing over the amount to be allocated on each 
project. The positive effects of this spending were expected to increase the GDP growth to 
over 3% by 2021. Many economists remain skeptical about the possibility to achieve this 
goal, as confirmed by Figure 6 data. In January, the new Russian Prime Minister Mikhail 
Mishustin promised again to speed up the fulfilment of the above-mentioned national 




In January 2020 during a session of the State Duma (the lower house of Parliament), the new 
Russian Prime Minister Mishustin highlighted the importance of implementing the program 
regarding the above-mentioned 13 key national projects (in 13 key different areas) to spur the 
stalled economic growth and make Russia the fifth biggest economy in the world by 2024. The 
Russian Prime Minister underlined that spending on these target areas will amount to 
approximately 25.7 trillion roubles ($417 billion) and involve private as well as state funds 
according to governmental plans. Below are listed some of the key targets for each national project: 
1. Healthcare. Costs: 1.73 trillion roubles for providing medical care to all Russians and raising the 
average life expectancy of Russians to 78 by 2024 from 71.6 now. 
2. Education. Costs: 785 billion roubles for reshaping the Russian education system into a globally 
competitive system, with an ambitious goal to enter the world’s top 10 in terms of quality and 
double the number of applicants from abroad by offering attractive higher education options for 
foreigners. 
3. Demography. Costs: 3.11 billion of roubles for increasing the birth rate to 1.7 children per 
woman from 1.62 by 2024, and providing financial support to improve the family well-being 
including preferential mortgage rates at 6% and free courses for women on maternity leave. 
4. Culture. Costs: 114 billion roubles for increasing visits to cultural institutions by 15%, including 
theatres and libraries and raising the number of people with access to digital cultural resources, 
such as online streaming of events. 
5. Safe and quality roads. Costs: 4.78 trillion roubles for reducing the vehicle fatality rate by one 
third by 2024 through investment in road infrastructure and smart traffic control systems.  
 
14Informal group of official creditors whose role is to find sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties 
experienced by debtor countries. As debtor countries undertake reforms to stabilize their macroeconomic 
and financial situation, Paris Club provides an appropriate debt treatment. 
15After fluctuating within a tight band near $105 per barrel from 2011-2013, crude oil prices ended 2014 at 
less than $60 per barrel. 
Box 1. Russia: list of upcoming projects 
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6. Housing and urban environment. Costs: 1.07 trillion roubles for providing affordable housing 
to middle-income families, including mortgage loans of less than 85, and for building 53 million 
square meters of residential buildings each year by 2024. 
7. Ecology. Costs: 4.04 trillion roubles for creating new national parks with an area of three 
millions of hectares. 
8. Science. Costs: 636 billion roubles for becoming one of the top five countries in the world 
praised for scientific research and development excellence, which should mark a jump from the 
11th place in 2019, and offering attractive working conditions and environment to foreign 
scientists, with 30% of all new laboratories to be led by young researchers. 
9. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Costs: 482 billion roubles for having 25 million 
people employed in SMEs or working as individual entrepreneurs by 2024 and increasing the 
share of SMEs as a percentage of GDP to 32.5 by 2024 from 22.9 in 2019. 
10. Digital economy. Costs: 1.63 trillion roubles for providing internet access to everyone, up from 
45.2% in 2019, and covering the largest Russian cities with 5G. 
11. Productivity and employment support. Costs: 52 billion roubles for increasing labour 
productivity by 5% per year for medium and large companies. 
12. International cooperation and exports. Costs: 957 billion roubles for increasing the export of 
goods beyond the energy and raw material sectors to $250 billion by 2024 from $160 billion in 2019 
and for increasing the share of exports in manufacturing, agricultural products, and services to 
20% of GDP by 2024. 
13. Modernization of infrastructures. Costs: 6.35 trillion roubles for modernizing key travel 
infrastructure, including air travel, railways, roads, sea, and river infrastructure, in an effort to 
improve the economic connection across the country. 
 
4. Improvement of socio-economic indicators. The data on inflation (from 2015 to 2019), 
budget deficit and poverty rate reveal that the government’s economic policies have been 
quite effective. Inflation dropped from 12.9% in 2015 to 2.8% in 2019 and the federal 
budget decreased from 3.4% in 2016 to 1.5% in 2019. After a significant drop since the 
early 2000s, the poverty rate is currently stable at around 13%. Government policies to 
lower the unemployment rate have also been successful. For that indicator, the World 
Bank provides data for Russia from 1991 to 2020. The average value for Russia during that 
period was 7.3% with a minimum of 4.43% in 2019 and a maximum of 13.3% in 1998 
(Figure 7).  
 
         Figure 7- Russia's unemployment rate 
 
Source: theglobaleconomy.com (2021). 
12 
 
Agriculture played a key role among the economic sectors that allowed for a moderate 
growth of the Russian economy since 2016. This sector produces around 3.7% of the 
country's GDP, employs 9.2 % of the national workforce and contributes around 6% to the 
country's exports. The sector has shown remarkable resilience in the face of wider 
economic turbulence, and self-sufficiency rates for the main agricultural commodities are 
relatively high (Kuzminov et al., 2018). 
 
During the last 15 years, Russian economy showed ability to recover from difficult 
periods within some limits. The government's policies improved the country’s public 
finances and the economic activities in a context of deteriorated international relationships 
with many Western nations. However, several analysts argue that a long-term sustainable 
growth is possible only if the following main socio-economic issues are solved: 
1. Demographic trend. In the next 40 years, the working-age population will shrink by 
approximately 25 million, that is, by one quarter. For the Russian economy, this adverse 
demographic trend is having two major consequences: (a) reduction of the labour supply; 
and (b) population aging. Population aging has a negative impact on the fiscal 
sustainability of the public pension, healthcare, and long-term care systems by increasing 
the old-age dependency ratio. It might also contribute to slower total factor productivity 
(hereinafter TFP) growth as young employees are more dynamic and open to innovation. 
2. Capital Investment. Its level, which well exceeds 20%, places Russia in the middle of 
the large emerging market economies (EMEs) group (Fig. 8). It is lower than in China, 
India, and Indonesia, but higher compared to Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa, and 
similar to Mexico. Again, given that Russia represents the highest GDP per capita level (in 
PPP terms) in the analysed group, its recent total investment rate does not seem to be too 
low to generate higher growth rate. In other words, it is not the low volume of investment 
that is harming Russia's economic growth, but rather its low effectiveness. Interestingly, 
the rate of gross national saving in Russia exceeds systematically the rate of investment, 
generating permanent current account surplus. This is partly a result of the presence of 
substantial oil and gas rent, but it may also suggest a shortage of attractive investment 
opportunities due to the poor business and investment climate (Dabrowski, 2019). So, 
given the current situation Russia’s economy will continue to grow at less than 2% (Aris, 
2019). 
 
    Fig. 8 - Total investment in large emerging-market economies, 2000–2018 (% of GDP) 
 
    Source:  IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2019.  
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3. Productivity. The deficit of labour resources could be at least partly compensated by an 
increase in TFP. According to Voskoboynikov (2017), TFP and the effectiveness of labour 
allocation in the Russian economy have deteriorated since the mid-2000s. Growth in 
labour productivity was relatively fast in the early and mid-2000s when the Russian 
economy partly benefited from post-transformation reallocation of already existing 
production factors but then substantially decelerated to below 2% annually (Rosstat, 2019). 
In 2009 and 2015–2016, which are the years of recession, labour productivity declined 
(Dabrowski, 2019). 
As regards 2020, the latest World Bank analysis forecast a contraction of the Eurasian 
country’s economy. Russia started this year with an official forecast for 1.9% growth. But 
the double combination of an oil price shock because of OPEC production cut deal (on 
March 6) closely followed by an escalating corona virus (COVID-19) pandemic that has 




Russian economy has been hit hard by the COVID shutdown of the economy and the collapse in 
crude oil prices; indeed, the country’s GDP contracted by almost 4.0% in 2020, and services have 
been significantly affected amid abrupt changes in consumer behavior and a fall in disposable 
income. At the same time, the outsized role of the public sector cushioned the negative impact on 
employment. The macroeconomic framework, centered on a flexible exchange rate, also served the 
economy well. Furthermore, currency depreciation led to strong import compression and 
supported budget revenues, but did not limit monetary policy space much, given a low pass-
through of goods prices and downward inflationary pressures from services (EU Commission, 
2020). Whereas, gradually, thanks to the vaccination campaign (by using the “Sputnik” vaccine) 
the Russian government is trying to speed up the achievement of the so-called “herd immunity”, 
and the situation regarding the spread of COVID-19 is improving in several cities, the majors 
started to lift restrictions. For example, on January 27th the Moscow’s major decided to lift 
restrictions on the night-time (from 11pm to 6am) work of catering enterprises, nightclubs, bars, as 
well as other entertainment establishments. Thus, given the underlying assumption that further 
lockdowns are avoided, consumer and business confidence are expected to improve in 2021. This 
would pave the way for a gradual GDP rebound at about 2.8% in 2021, and 3.0% in 2022 (World 
Bank, 2020). As uncertainty diminishes, household consumption is expected to lead the recovery, 
and investment. However, even with positive GDP growth ahead, GDP levels in 2022 will barely 
catch up to pre-pandemic levels. The general government budget is expected to turn to deficit in 
2021-22. Although, the official unemployment rate remains relatively low insecurity in the formal 
sector, the return of migrant workers to their home countries and downward wage pressure weigh 
on consumption. Investment is set to remain depressed for the remainder of this year and to grow 
only slowly in 2021 and beyond, as the investment climate remains negative and many SMEs lack 
access to finance. At the same time, the uncertain outlook for the oil sector is expected to dampen 
investment in the energy sector (World Bank, 2020). Notwithstanding the Prime Minister intention 
to accelerate the implementation of the national infrastructures, after a strong start in 2020, driven 
by the rollout of national infrastructure projects, public investment stalled as the authorities 
reprioritised resources toward public consumption. Public consumption is expected to remain 
elevated while public investment is not projected to regain traction over the forecast horizon (EU 
Commission, 2020). Russia’s economic potentialities to be fully realised need structural solutions 
as regards the following aspects: (a) widespread property rights issues; (b) the outsized role of the 
energy sector and SOEs in the economy; (c) an improvement of the competition conditions, 
economic openness, and innovation. Indeed, it is a matter of fact that these structural changes are 
likely to be more limiting factor to growth under current circumstances of lower oil prices and 
subdued global demand. According to the EU Commission Directorate-General for Economic and 
Box 2. Russian economy in the COVID-19 era: some facts 
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Financial Affairs (2020), the revamping of the macroeconomic framework after the 2014/2015 crisis 
helped to stabilize the economy but it was insufficient to lift potential growth. Consequently, only 
a moderate growth of 3% is expected in 2022. It is interesting to point out that the macroeconomic 
framework in its current form enabled interest rates to be slashed by a cumulative 500 basis points 
to 4.25% since 2017; in fact, inflation pressures remained contained and headline inflation 
remained below the 4% target for most of the last three years (2018-2020, see for details figure 4). 
According to the Central Bank of Russia (2020), headline inflation reached a trough in March of 
2020 (2.5%) due to base effects and past RUB appreciation but rebounded to 3.7% in October. In the 
future, inflation is expected to stay below the target as good harvest in 2020 put a lid on food 
prices in the near term, private consumption remains subdued and favourable base effects kick in 
in 2021. In the response to the COVID-19 crisis, the government throughout the 2020, implemented 
a large set of fiscal stimulus measures (2.5% of GDP), including support to the health system, 
increased social expenses and a limited support to SMEs. Therefore, expenditures rose by almost 
28% in 2020. Budget revenues were down by 12% over the same period, mostly due to lower oil-
related income. As consequence, the fiscal deficit is set to reach 4¼% of GDP after a surplus of 0.4% 
in 2019. Going forward, the deficit is expected to shrink to about 3¼% of GDP in 2021 and 2% in 
2022, as expenditures are set to decline given lower immediate pandemic-related needs, and new 
taxes, mainly on mining, are introduced. The higher spending in 2020 required adjustments to 
several budget rules and a strong rise in the issuance of domestic bonds to finance growing public 
debt, which is set to increase from 14% of GDP in 2019 to 22½% of GDP in 2022. Major downside 
risks come from oil markets as a worsening pandemic could further suppress both oil demand and 
prices. In addition, the investment climate could turn even more negative, as taxes rise and fiscal 
support will be limited. The major upside risks include a firming oil market, a waning pandemic 
and more fiscal support (EU Commission, 2020). 
 
Agro-food policies in the Communist era: an overview 
 
How collectivization affected the USSR agro-food sector 
The analysis of Russia’s agricultural policies shall also include the Communist 
Party’s approach to the management of agriculture’s issues in USSR. The key word for 
understanding USSR agro-food policies is “collectivization”, which can be defined as the 
organization of all country’s industries so that it is owned and managed by the 
government16. After the Bolsheviks took the power in 1917, several reforms aimed to shift 
the form of national-private agro-food farms to large scale production. Hereinafter, an 
overview of the main issues characterizing the agriculture “collectivization process” 
during the most relevant leaderships of the Communist era will be provided:   
1. The Stalin period (1924-1953). As soon as Stalin became the USSR Communist Party 
Secretary, the “agro-food sector collectivization” speeded up by a long series of reforms, 
which affected rural/urban population and the socio-economic life. The main 
consequences for the population were: (a) consumer goods’ shortages and poor-quality 
products; (b) poor planning-management systems and dysfunctional prices’ policies 
adopted by the authorities. In the attempt of making food accessible to all, the government 
heavily subsidized the price of food. Thus, wholesale prices were lower than farm 
production costs, and retail prices were lower than wholesale prices (Pavlov, 1988). The 
result was an “excess of demand” for products that were under-priced at the retail level, 
leading to a chronic shortage. In rural areas, political choices to support the country’s 
industrialization process harshly affected the peasants' wealth, and in particular: (a) the 
reorganization of the agricultural bodies (Sovkhovozes and Kolkhozes) for the transformation 
 
16 Cambridge Dictionary definition. 
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of the USSR agricultural sector into an intensive industrialised activity; (b) the 
establishment of a “farmers’ super tax” as an over-payment that peasants had to pay for 
manufactured goods; (c) an under-payment received for the agricultural goods that they 
produced (Dyker, 1982). Farmers reacted angrily to the forced seizure of land. 
Furthermore, Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes were poorly organized, and food processing-
distribution was inefficient. The state direct control over agriculture allowed to the USSR 
leadership to earn foreign exchange (used to support the heavy industry through the 
acquisition of industrial machinery) by increasing agricultural export (in 1931 was 
exported 18% of the wheat production). The result was a further surge of population 
affected by famine. Stalin provided some incentives to the peasants allowing households 
to farm small pieces of land and raise limited amounts of livestock. In 1953, 45.7% of the 
collective family farm income came from the private plots. This aspect suggested that: (a) 
farmers were able to feed themselves from private plots, which became their main 
economic activity; (b) the USSR agriculture collectivization process was doomed to fail 
(Ostrovskii 1967). 
2. The Khrushchev period (1953-1964). In 1953, when Khrushchev became the USSR 
Communist Party Secretary, he made several attempts to fine-tune the problems affecting 
the country’s agro-food sector. An important decision was made to sharply raise the 
procurement prices. Thus, peasants’ incomes doubled between 1953 and 1967 allowing for 
an upward shift in the investments’ flow into the farm sector. Indeed, in 1950 agriculture 
accounted for 15% of USSR gross investment and by 1965 it had risen to 16.7% (Gregory 
and Stewart, 1981; Dyker, 1982). During the period of 1954-1965 improved incentives and 
increased investments facilitated a surge of 70% in the agricultural output (Gregory and 
Stewart, 1981). Although Khrushchev put several efforts to revive the national agri-food 
sector, at the same time he used many resources for various campaigns of questionable 
value, such as: (a) the corn campaign (ineffective at all)17; (b) the massive extension of 
sown area into the semi-arid “virgin lands”, which produced impressive short-term 
results at the cost of long-term environmental damage, as erosion set in (Dyker, 1982). 
Thus, in the early 1960s the USSR agro-food sector was once again affected by low growth 
rates. After “Stalin’s gloomy period”, Khrushchev surely improved the peasants’ 
economic conditions. However, although he went a long way towards decentralization, he 
did not address thoroughly the problems regarding: (a) ownership relation; (b) 
problematic relationships between producer and land; (c) producer and means of 
production, which all remained unsolved (Szelenyi, 1998). Finally, some of the issues 
affecting the agro-food sector during the Stalin’s era were not solved as well, considering 
that: (a) the strategy of encouraging extensive growth continued; (b) the imbalance 
between industry and agriculture persisted; (c) the Communist Party attempt to increase 
the agrarian production not only by channelling (inefficiently) resources and technological 
 
17To increase meat supply, Khrushchev sought to popularize corn as a fodder crop. Corn’s areas rose from 
4.3 million hectares (1954) to 18 million hectares (1955). The hot weather in two successive seasons allowed 
for abundant corn harvests. But rather than concentrating on more efficient agronomic practices, the USSR 
authorities expanded corn acreage to areas with unsuitable climate conditions and labour supplies. By 1960 
the total acreage increased to 28 million ha, reaching 37 million by 1962. In 1964, cool spring and early 
summer throughout European Russia proved disastrous for corn. What made matters worse was that hay 
production declined throughout the country, from 64 million tons in 1953 to 47 million in 1965. These aspects 




inputs, but also by expanding the amount of agricultural land in unfitted areas for grain 
crops. 
3. The Brezhnev period (1964-1982). The Brezhnev period (1964 -1982) was marked by 
huge governmental efforts to solve issues such as: (a) provide adequate capital in 
agriculture; (b) acquire new technology and apply it efficiently throughout the entire 
country; (c) amend the imbalances in the regional agriculture; (d) correct the inefficiencies 
in the organization and management of farm work; (e) cope with consumer demands for 
more and better food and with pressures to improve the rural living conditions. From 1965 
to 1985 about 28% of all investments were allocated to the agricultural sector (Szelenyi, 
1998). However, the more resources government channeled into the agricultural sector 
(Table 2), the more bureaucratic structure was required by the Communist Party to 
manage these resources. 
 
Table 2 - Investments in agricultural fixed assets covering the whole complex of work (in 
comparable prices; thousand million roubles) 
 
Source:Dandoand Schlichting, March 1988. 
 
Investments increased the agricultural productivity until the late 1970s (figure 9) at 
prohibitive financial-environmental costs. The USSR government neglected the structural 
problems of the agricultural production, which had the following negative consequences: 
(a) investments managed by bureaucrats created an agricultural system prone to 
imbalances (e.g.: food consumption did not increase as rapidly as food production); (b) 
bureaucratic inefficiency brought the country towards a lag of agricultural productivity 
(Szelenyi, 1998). Times series data (1960-2000) regarding the agricultural sector production 
index mark a growth at world pace during the 1960s and 1970s, followed by a lag since the 
beginning of the 1980s (Figure 9). 
 
      Figure 9 – Agricultural production index: former USSR and the world (1961 = 100). 
 
      Source:  FAO on-line database, available at http://www.fao.org, Lerman et al., (2003). 
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At the end of 1970s - beginning of 1980s, USSR imported almost 50 million tons of grain: 
1/4 of Soviet grain came from abroad. Over 1/2 of this imported grain came from the 
USA, and it filled part of 60-millions-tons-gap amongst the 1982 target of 230 million tons 
and the harvest of 175 million tons (USDA, 1982). The grain production trend between the 
USSR and the USA (its main competitor in that period) displays that although the USA 
grain output from 1950 to early 1970s was higher than the USSR's one, the rising trends in 
overall grain production in the two countries during this period were parallel (Figure 10) 
(USDA, 1982, Brown, 1982). However, since the mid-1970s, agricultural trends in the two 
countries diverged sharply (Figure 10). Because of the massive Soviet purchase of USA 
wheat in 1972 and tight world grain supplies in subsequent years, the USA government 
removed most of its grain production constraints. Between the early 1970s and the early 
1980s the grain output boosted from 215 million tons per year to over 300 million tons per 
year. 
 
       Figure 10– USA and Soviet Grain Production, 1950-1982. 
 
    Sources: USDA and Brown, 1982. 
 
The difference between the agricultural performances of the two geopolitical superpowers 
can be ascribed to several factors: (a) different technologies employed (modern USA grain 
and corn breeders created hybrids that led to additional significant increase); (b) USA 
farmers’ market discipline (for USA farmers failing to carefully match fertilizer use and 
crops needs leaded to declining profits); (c) the fact that in USSR , with no market forces to 
impose discipline, farmers very often use agro-technical tools (fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) 
inefficiently; (d) the fact that the USSR farming premises could not be easily reached by 
shipments transporting agro-technical tools through the existing rail or road networks. 
Thus, the Soviets lost the advantage gained by the already mentioned massive 
investments in agricultural technical tools.  
4. Gorbachev period (1985-1990). The structural crisis of the Soviet agri-food sector 
continued also in the second half of the 1980s. Due to the USSR struggling economic 
performances President Gorbachev launched a vast reform program including the 
agricultural sector. Compared to the previous years the amounts of investments marked a 
moderate increase with this program (table 2). The USSR leader tried to solve the 
persistent problems with food distribution responsible for the food shortage among the 
population. Gorbachev thought that an organizational reform was also needed. He was 
aware of Russia's agricultural regional diversity, which was impossible to manage from a 
central position. The decentralization of the decision-making system was a high priority of 
Gorbachev’s political agenda. He also supported the maintenance of private plots by 
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kolkhoz peasants. Gorbachev tried to combine the strength of Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
policies implementing: (a) a policy of decentralization and autonomy for agricultural 
holdings and peasants; (b) investments in the modernization of the agricultural sector. 
However, the main weakness of Gorbachev’s policies was that they did not tackle the 
ownership’s issue, thus failing to realize that a property reform for the agricultural sector 
would have been necessary. During the period between 1985 and 1990 few efforts were 
invested to solve the price problem. In 1990, retail food subsidies accounted for 56% of the 
total agricultural subsidies, a statistic that rose to 80% in 1991 (World Bank, 1993). As the 
Soviet planned economy unraveled with the Gorbachev’s reforms, the vast system of 
subsidies became unsustainable and inflation increased rapidly for food goods (Wegren, 
2011). As in the previous years, many people relied on private plots to compensate for 
food shortages (an important supplementary source of food also for urban families). Tens 
of millions of collective and state farm workers, urban workers and their families were 
engaged in “private agriculture” in the 1980s (Gregory and Stuart, 1986). These plots also 
provided the rural households with means for survival during the turbulent 1990s. 
Probably Gorbachev’s ambition to keep conservatives and pragmatists working together 
was an impossible task, and probably one of the main causes for the decline of his political 
career (Szelenyi, 1998). 
 
Russia’s agro-food policies 
 
Russian agro-food policies: from the emergency context to the global achievements  
The liberalization of the USSR economy in the early 1990s brought chaotic socio-
economic policies also in the field of agro-food activities, which were more about undoing 
USSR legacy rather than building a distinct post-USSR model (Wegren, 2016). For 
example, the “Law on Peasant Farms” legalized private holdings and allowed them to 
operate alongside state and collective farms, to hire labor and to sell products without 
state supervision. Post-USSR agro-food policies saw a sudden withdrawal of the 
government from planning the production output. Thus, production was no longer 
guided by bureaucratic priorities, but by market forces instead (Wegren, 2016). Agro-food 
policies in the post-communist Russia may be divided into four periods, which will be 
discussed below: 
1. The Yeltsin period (1992-1999). After Boris Yeltsin became the first President of the 
Russian Federation (May 1990), the enactment of the “Land Reform” and the “Russian 
Federation Law on Autonomous Farms” brought to the privatization of large collective 
and state farms. Farm managers gained the freedom to make production decisions based 
on consumer demand and to shift the structure of production accordingly. However, 
managerial behaviour was constrained by an economic collapse, decreasing the real 
consumer incomes and the demand for food. Large farms (former state/collective farms), 
faced with a decline of the consumer demand, disadvantageous terms of trade, and the 
lack of governmental financial support, cut their production (Lerman, 2002; Liefert and 
Liefert, 2012; Wegren, 2016; Rada 2017). By 1996 the government estimated that food 
production on large farms had fallen to 52% of the 1990 level (Goskomstat, 2000). Much of 
the responsibility for production subsidies was transferred to regional governments; 
federal subsidies that were budgeted usually were not distributed. As a result, the 
agricultural subsidies that had reached an estimated 20% of the state budget in 1990–91 
fell drastically and large farms were left to fend for themselves. The reduction of revenues 
caused by the decrease of the consumer demand and the state subsidies led to farm 
19 
 
unprofitability (Wegren, 2016). In 1990, owing to extensive state subsidies and support 
only 3% of farm enterprises were unprofitable; by 1994 already 60% were unprofitable, 
and by 1998 nearly nine in 10 large farms were unprofitable (Goskomstat, 2000). The quick 
shift from a centralized economic system towards a free-market system also affected the 
consumption. Indeed, food retail prices that had been heavily subsidized in the USSR 
period were now free. Thus, state control over food retail prices ended for all but for a 
handful of products notably bread until 1993 (Wegren, 2016). The liberalization of the 
retail food process led to runaway consumer inflation causing a significant increase of the 
food products' prices: (a) 2670% in 1992; (b) 940% in 1993; (c) 330% in 1994; (d) 220% in 
1995, before falling to a 13% increase in 1996 (Goskomstat, 2000). The combination of high 
inflation, wage arrears, and a decline of the living standard led to a significant increase of 
poverty, which became an acute social problem. If the Soviet Union was perceived to be 
food-insecure, post-communist Russia in the 1990s was even more so. The liberalization of 
the land policies provoked a doubling of the amount of land used by rural households for 
subsidiary agriculture during 1990-1996 (Wegren, 2016). Furthermore, after decades of 
slow decline, the area of land used by urbanites such as dacha plots increased too 
(Goskomstat, 1999). Thus, the number of transactions with the state declined from nearly 
140,000 in 1993 to less than 45,000 in 1996, while the number of transactions between 
individuals increased from 10,000 in 1993 to more than 200,000 in 1995 and 1996. 
Therefore, farm debt and unprofitability soared. However, the land liberalization 
restructuring program progressed slowly (Wegren and Belen’kyi, 1998). In that period, 
although 95% of the state collective farms underwent some form of reorganization, about 
1/3 of them retained their earlier structure. The vast majority of the remaining fractions 
chose the collective ownership (joint - stock companies or cooperatives) as organizational 
structure due to unstable conditions of the market faced by individual entrepreneurs. The 
second governmental response entailed liberalizing trade policy. Whereas Soviet foreign 
trade was planned and USSR imported mainly feed grain from the West, in the post-
communist period the structure of food imports changed to consumer products. Even as 
the consumer demand for food decreased exacerbated by high food inflation, the volume 
and value of food imports increased, thus reflecting the inability of Russian farms to 
produce enough agriculture commodities to feed the nation. The size of livestock herds 
plummeted surpassing the declines that occurred in the early years of Stalin’s 
collectivization, and thus meat imports soared. The import of grain for feed declined 
because of the precipitous decrease in the number of cows and pigs (Wegren, 2005). The 
main reasons for the Russian agro-food system poor performances in the 1990s can be 
summarized as follows: 
• Agro-food sector market-oriented reforms were implemented too fast disregarding the 
effect that they could have had within an economic environment that was characterized 
by government planned and centralized economic policies ever since the Bolsheviks 
took power in 1917. 
• The economic reforms caused output prices to fall below the real cost of production of 
goods, exacerbating the producers’ terms of trade during the 1990s (Macours and 
Swinnen, 2000; Lerman et al., 2003). Russia’s domestic agricultural terms of trade 
(output prices relative to input prices) in this period fell by 76 percent (Rada, 2017).  
• The severe socio-economic conditions of the population (in the urban and rural areas) 
caused a decline of the government’s revenues with a reduction of direct budget 
subsidies for the agricultural operators. 
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• The plunging of trade liberalization domestic prices compared to world prices and the 
elimination of the indirect price subsidies, as domestic prices for inputs and output had 
to adjust with world market demand and competition (Rada et al., 2017). 
• The reduction of output below the real cost level of producing goods, which 
exacerbated the producers’ terms of trade (Macours and Swinnen, 2000; Lerman et al., 
2003). Russia’s domestic agricultural terms of trade (output prices relative to input 
prices) in this period fell by 76 percent meaning that the revenue generated from a 
basket of agricultural products could buy on average only one-quarter of the inputs in 
2000 that it could in 1990 (Rada et al., 2017).  
Data demonstrate that the relevant plunge of Producer Support Estimate (PSE)18caused a 
relevant decrease in the agricultural output (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11 - PSE indicator trends (1986-2019) in the Russian Federation, OECD countries, EU (28 
MS), Japan, USA, and Australia 
 
Source: OECD - Agricultural support estimates (2020). 
 
In this regard figures 12 and 13 show a relevant shrinkage in the agricultural output both 
for the livestock and the grain sector. 
 
Figure 12- Russian meat production and imports note: both production and imports cover beef, 
pork, and poultry broilers. 
 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service. 
 
18PSE: annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, 
measured at the farm-gate level, arising from policy measures that support agriculture, regardless of their 
nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or income. PSE % is the PSE as a share of gross farm 
receipts (including support). 
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Figure 13- Russian grain production and exports trend 1986-2014. Note: The bars give average 
annual grain production over the periods 1986-1990, 1991-95, 1996-2000, 2001-05, 2006-10, and 
2011-14. Negative net grain exports are net imports. 
 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using Russian Federal State Statistics Service and Ministry of Agriculture 
data and USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, Production, Supply and Distribution database. 
 
Additionally, the analysis of the Russian agricultural sector added value highlights that 
from 1991 until 2000 the country’s economic performance plunged noticeably compared to 
the previous years with a minimum of 12.89 billion of USA dollars in 1999 (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14 - Russia's agriculture added value (billions of USD). 
 
Source: the GlobalEconomy.com.* For that indicator, the World Bank provides data for Russia from 1989 to 2016. The 
average value for Russia during that period was 43.14 billion USA dollars with a minimum of 12.89 billion USA 
dollarsin1999 and a maximum of 79.9 billion USA dollars in 1990. 
 
The Yeltsin period witnessed an overall decline of the agro-food economic performances. 
Also animal stocks declines exceeded those related to Stalin’s collectivization. 
Furthermore, land reclamation virtually ceased and harvests fell. The extraordinarily bad 
harvest and the financial crisis led to regionally imposed price controls on food products. 
The analysis of the PSE and added value trends (Figures 11 and 14) show the magnitude of 
the economic crisis, which brought to an end the governmental help for producers in 1999. 
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Thus, Russia's food sovereignty fell in the hands of the western agro-food exporting 
nations in an attempt to prevent starvation in many of its regions. 
2. First period of Putin's agro-food policies (2000-2008). When Putin became president of 
the Russian Federation in 2000, the national agro-food sector was in poor conditions due 
to Yeltsin's ineffective policies. Thus, the focus moved from the liberalization of the 
economic activities to a new model of governance (similar to the “development state or 
hard state”19) with heavy governmental influence and a special focus on agriculture. 
Putin’s presidency goal was to raise the output volumes to the levels reached at the end of 
the 1980s and reduce notably the country’s dependence on food imports. The state 
strategic document “Directions of Agro-food Policy towards 2010” highlighted Russia's 
intention to strengthen the rural economy and stabilize food production by: (a) improving 
the agricultural operators’ financial status through debt reduction and increased 
budgetary allocations, allowing them to expand the production; (b) employing customs 
and tariff policies to ensure the incomes growth of the Russian agro-food entrepreneurs; 
(c) allowing domestic producers to compete with foreign imports by greater regulation of 
the grain market; (d) fostering credit organizations to improve access to finance; (e) 
improving the stock of agricultural machinery and changing the process of leasing; (f) 
supporting land consolidation policies. Hence, Putin created a state-owned agricultural 
bank20 by which state-credits and subsidies could be channelled to the rural areas during 
the sowing season. The government decided to: (a) defer farm debt repayment and wrote 
off tens of billions of roubles in penalties for late payment; (b) introduce a state 
intervention system in the grain market by buying grain to protect grain producers in 
surplus year (Wegren, 2016); (c) support the “integrated agro-holding model” as an 
essential pre-condition to accelerate farm production, rather than rely on greater output 
from small family farms. With this approach the government also aimed at increasing 
farms’ profitability and reducing the private households share in agricultural production 
(Kalugina, 2013). In 2002 arrived the approval of other legislative provisions allowing a 
free sale of land, which led to an expansion of the agricultural business and faster 
development of the land consolidation process. Around 82% of the agro-holdings and 
large-scale farms were reported as profitable during 2012. Also, a 2 billion rouble 
intervention fund was introduced to stabilize grain prices, whereby the authorities 
purchased grain in bumper years and released this grain during periods of shortage 
(Kingwell et al., 2016). Economic macro-results suggest that government support for 
domestic agro-food sector was successful considering that: (a) by the end of 2008, the 
nominal ruble value of agricultural production rose to more than 330% compared to 2000 
(Rosstat, 2010); (b) the percentage of unprofitable large farms fell to the 25-30% range, a far 
cry from the 1990s; (c) after 2006, Russia began to export significant quantities of grain; (d) 
personal incomes had grown by almost 800% (in nominal rubles) for all workers in the 
economy since 2000 (Wegren, 2016). Putin’s agro-food policies during his first presidential 
mandate were open but not entirely so. Indeed, despite the growth in food imports, 
 
19Developmental state, or hard state, is a term used by international political economy scholars to refer to the 
phenomenon of state-led macroeconomic planning in East Asia in the late twentieth century. In this model of 
capitalism (sometimes referred to as state development capitalism), the state has more independent, or 
autonomous, political power, as well as more control over the economy.  
20Russian Agricultural Bank is a state-owned bank based in Moscow. The bank was established pursuant to 
the Decree of the then acting Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 15, 2000, to support the 
development of agriculture and agro-industry. 
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starting in 2001 Russia began to use import quotas, and later, tariff-rate import quotas 
(TRQs)21. The latter are permitted under the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. 
3. The Medvedev period (2008-2012). The main national agro-food policies that were 
introduced in the previous years, continued also with Dimitri Medvedev who was elected 
President of Russia in 2008 (Yaffa, 2015). The agro-food policies during Medvedev’s 
presidency are marked by three aspects: 
• Huge government support. The 2008-2012 state program for the agro-food development 
reached an unprecedented level of governmental support for domestic production. 
More than 1 trillion of roubles were allocated to support the national agro-food sector. 
However, after three years of good harvests, in 2010 Russia lost 1/3 of its harvest due to 
an anomalous dry season; the harvest came in at only 60 million tons. Thus, state 
support increased as the government introduced emergency measures to protect 
livestock herds. The government’s reaction to the emergency solidified the belief that 
state assistance was the primary mechanism that spurred growth or averted disaster 
(Wegren, 2011).    
• The rise of food insecurity. This is a rather curious outcome, considering that domestic 
production had rebounded, farm profitability was up, personal incomes were 
increasing, and the national poverty rate was declining. Policymakers’ concerns over 
food security may have stemmed from vulnerabilities in the Russian economy during 
the financial crisis of 2008-2009 due to the rising bill for food imports, or simply 
because of leadership insecurity tinged with Russian nationalism (Wegren, 2016). The 
outcome was the introduction of a food security policy signed into force by Medvedev 
in January 2010, which implied reduced import quotas and rising import tariffs on 
meat and pork, continued use of food import bans, and a year-long export ban on 
grain due to the poor harvest (Elvestad et al., 2010). The approaching WTO 
membership caused a general import tariffs reduction for Russia (Liefert et al., 2009). 
However, as it happens, on the eve of WTO accession Russia maintained the use of 
Tariffs Rates Quotas (TRQs) applied to meat imports. In the last year of Medvedev’s 
presidency (2012) Russia joined the WTO but was given a transition period to come 
into full compliance with green box requirements in agriculture. 
• Export increase. Medvedev was determined to put Russia on the throne as a key 
international agro-food export player. The government targeted the Asian region as a 
growth market, allocating federal funds to the country’s far east region to improve the 
infrastructure and facilitate food exports. Russian leaders set a goal to export 40–50 
million tons of grain by 2020. Hence, domestic subsidies contributed to a post-Soviet 
record harvest in 2008 with 108 million tons after cleaning. The USA Department of 
Agriculture estimated that Russia could become the number one exporter of wheat by 
2019, surpassing the United States (Liefert et al., 2010). 
4. Second period of Putin's agro-food policies (2012- present). With Putin's re-election in 
March 2012 there were several positive socio-economic indicators considering that: (a) the 
rouble value food production had nearly quadrupled compared to that in 2000; (b) the 
 
21TRQs apply lower tariff rates up to an established quota and apply much higher tariff rates above the 
threshold. TRQs were applied to imports of beef, pork, and poultry. It was also during Putin’s first two 
terms that import bans became common, particularly, but not exclusively, against poultry from the USA 
(Wegren, 2005). These bans became more frequent but were temporary and were applied against specific 
states or processing plants. Once the sanitary concern was addressed to the satisfaction of the Russian side, 




agricultural sector rebounded from severe drought in 2010; (c) the economy recovered 
from the financial meltdown of 2008-2009; (d) the poverty rate declined to a post-Soviet 
low; (e) the percentage of profitable farms increased so that nearly eight of ten large farms 
turned a profit (Wegren, 2016; Shagaida and Uzun, 2013). With the WTO membership 
Russia seemed to enter a new cooperation phase. In 2012 the Government adopted the 
“State Program for Development of Agriculture and Regulation of Agricultural 
Commodities Markets in 2013-2020”, which envisioned 1.5 trillion of roubles and 
encompassed the following issues: (a) the increase of food production by 21%; (b) the 
increase of processed food production by 35 %; (c) the increase of investment by 42 %. The 
state program contained financial support for six subprograms (plant production and 
processing, animal husbandry production and processing, meat production, technological 
modernization, development of small scale farming, program administration). 
Furthermore, the same program contained two federal targeted programs on rural 
territories development and land reclamation. The main concern of Russia’s agro-food 
policies was the country's ability to adapt to the new conditions and requirements 
imposed by the WTO membership and the governmental support effectiveness to lead the 
Russian agriculture to the top (Wegren, 2016). As previously mentioned, the Crimea’s 
crisis was of crucial importance for the development of Russia’s agro-food and trade 
policies. The establishment of Western sanctions after the annexation of the Black Sea 
peninsula provoked Moscow to impose import ban on some agro-food goods originated 
from the countries that declared sanctions on Russia, such as the USA, EU, Canada, 
Australia and Norway (extended later on Albania, Montenegro, Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
the Ukraine). The import ban included beef and pork of all kinds, poultry products, 
smoked foodstuffs, dairy products (including raw milk) as well as fish, and fruits-
vegetables products. As a result, the Russian government increased the support for 
domestic agriculture in order to become more self-reliant. Thus, in December 2014 the 
agriculture development state program was amended and federal expenditures were 
raised to 640 billion roubles over the original amount (increasing to more than 2.1 trillion 
roubles in federal expenditures). The first order priority of the state program is “to achieve 
food independence of the country within the food security doctrine parameters” (Ministry 
of Agriculture, 2015). The main consequences were: 
• The value of agro-food exports to Russia from the Euro 28 reduced by 43 %, being Euro 
11.0 billion in 2013/14 compared with less of Euro 6.3 billion during 2014/17 (Kingwell 
et al., 2016). 
• The bans fuelled food and general inflation in Russia and lessened food availability to 
the local population, providing at the same time additional export opportunities for 
countries like Brazil (not being subject to the ban); additionally, production 
opportunities arose for Russian producers of foodstuffs. 
• The downturn of the energy sector, which led the government to view agriculture as a 
future engine of economic growth. Prominent Russian policymakers agreed that new 
drivers for Russia’s economic growth must be considered, and in particular: agriculture, 
chemicals, the food industry and the domestic tourism. 
The above statements are correct, considering that a well-organized and efficient agro-
food sector can generate several positive socio-economic externalities, providing not only 
the main source of employment, but a range of other measurable benefits such as: (a) 
social cohesion; (b) sense of purpose. Both are in turn powerful drivers of well-being. 
Thus, the reforms implemented by the Russian government in these last 10 years in the 
agro-food sector have been able to provide to the country food security, self-sufficiency, 
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and exportable surpluses that generate foreign currency. The government’s choice to focus 
on the agro-food sector’s modernization and efficiency has been extremely appropriate, 
considering that the Eurasian country is blessed not only with energy resources but also 
with ample arable lands, which facilitate food production and make Russia less vulnerable 
in any conflict. Currently, wheat production in Russia is concentrated in a limited yet 
spatially protracted area with six economic regions accounting for more than 95% of the 
total wheat production in Russia (Figure 15). North Caucasus is the largest wheat 
producing region (40%), followed by West Siberia, Volga and Black Earth (each with a 15% 
share), while the wheat production in Ural and the Central region constitutes 8% and 7% 
respectively of the total wheat production (Rosstat, 2019).  
 
       Figure 15 - Map of Russia’s grain producing regions. 
 
         Source: Svanidze and Götz, 2019. 
 
Thus, the country’s self-sufficiency in food production and energy, and the ability of the 
Russian economic diplomacy to export affordable grain, has undoubtedly strengthened its 
trading negotiating position in any possible dispute with several countries (especially 
those belonging to the MENA region). In this regard, agricultural goods have become 
Russia’s second biggest export after oil and gas. Besides the increased governmental 
subsidies to farmers, the sector has also benefited from Russia’s geographical position 
with highly fertile “black earth” regions in central and southern Russia located close to the 
export terminals on the Black Sea. Finally, as will be analysed in the next section, the trade 
routes allow the country to supply important North African and Middle Eastern wheat 
importers such as Egypt. 
 
At the origin of the Russian influence in the Middle East 
 
The new Russian policies in MENA regions 
As the USA (but also France and UK) standing in the MENA region has declined, 
Russia has been able to fill the power vacuum and position itself as a mediator and 
strategic partner in this area especially in the last five years. In the past, Russia has 
operated in the Middle East by applying traditional hard power strategies, supplying arms 




significantly in the recent years due to the new importance of rebuilding Russia’s 
reputation as a reliable ally (Cerulli, 2019). Moscow is also increasingly using soft power 
strategies to project influence throughout the Middle East. The successful exercise of soft 
power is a pivotal part of Putin’s renewed quest for “great-power” (Gunitsky, 2019). 
Achieving the “great-power” goal requires an extension of the Russian influence via soft 
power mechanisms into the MENA region, where hard power alone has been insufficient. 
Thus, commercial relationships between Russia and the countries belonging to the MENA 
region represent one of the key elements of the new Kremlin’s strategy. Agricultural trade 
of grain products between Russia and several countries belonging to the MENA region is a 
strategic activity through which Russia has gained prominence as a player in the Middle 
East. 
While several Western elites consider Russia to be a permanent threat, it is difficult to 
ignore that the Eurasian country's reputation in many other geopolitical areas and in 
particular in the MENA region is much more complex than that. There are probably 
different causes for the recent success of Russian policies in the region and especially in 
Syria: (a) the failure of the neo-conservative American policies in the MENA area; (b) an 
innovative policy in the region implemented by the Russian political elite. The latter 
aspect seems to be quite relevant; indeed, during the USSR era, authorities established a 
fruitful cooperation with the Arab world and Iran, but then this context changed 
significantly after 1991, considering that Russia was completely absent from the MENA 
region (Kozhanov, 2018).  The lack of Russian presence in the MENA can be ascribed to a 
series of factual and ideological reasons: (a) the domestic economic and political turmoil of 
the 1990s, which limited Russia’s export capacities diverting the attention from foreign to 
domestic policies; (b) the loss of the Ukrainian ports (main trade gateways of the Soviet 
Union to the Mediterranean), which affected business contacts with the Middle East (by 
the mid-1990s, the Arab countries made up just 1% of Russia’s annual trade: Oliker et al., 
2009); (c) the opposition of Russian policymakers to the development of relations with 
MENA countries because they saw the country as a part of the Western world, and so they 
were reluctant to develop those non-Western diplomacy vectors. 
After the end of the Yeltsin era, Russian officials tried again to build up closer 
relations with certain MENA countries. The return of Russia in the Middle East has been 
guided by the unfinished quest for the Russian identity, being both European and Asian 
country with Slavic and Muslim population. It also carries a definite heritage from the 
Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Therefore, Russia is a country that was built 
during the last twenty years. It is a bridge with the ‘Muslim world’, where Putin intends to 
play a defining role. However, these relations are affected by the jihadist threat on the 
Russian territory (Chechnya and Dagestan) and the memory of the war against the 
mujahideen in Afghanistan. Thus, Moscow is playing its part in the fight against terrorism, 
trying to avoid possible destabilization of central Asia, that is its “near abroad” (Therme, 
2014). For example, in 2003 President Putin carried out an intensive diplomatic action by 
visiting Egypt, Algeria, Jordan and Iran.  In addition, Moscow concentrated its effort not 
only on rebuilding the contacts with the old partners of the Soviet Union, but also to 
broaden its own influence in the region through active dialogue. Thus, in 2007 Putin 
visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE (, 2010). On the contrary, Medvedev’s presidency 
(2008-2012) was characterized by a de-prioritization of the relationships with the MENA 
countries, to be rebooted after 2012.  
Therefore, with the “second phase” of Putin’s presidency, Russia started looking 
again at the MENA region as an opportunity. According to Kozhanov (2018), the 
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transformation of the Russian economic and diplomatic policies towards the MENA 
region can be divided in three different periods: 
1. From 2012 to 2013. During this short period there was an increasing diplomatic activity 
with regional players. Russia abstained from direct involvement in the domestic affairs of 
the region, acting as a neutral power in ongoing conflicts. Relationships with Iran were 
reshaped as well as those with another influential regional player such as Egypt. In that 
period Moscow’s diplomacy reopened a fruitful dialogue on a wide range of diplomatic 
and economic issues with all the powerful MENA countries to avoid international 
isolation because of the tensions with the West. 
2. From late 2013 to 2015. Russia was increasingly involved in the Middle East domestic 
affairs that went beyond diplomatic approach, with the fully involvement of the country 
in the Syrian conflict (September 2015). On this occasion, Russia’s tough stance had a 
positive influence on its relations in the Middle East, considering that Moscow proved its 
ability of protecting its partners. Russia is still involved in the Syrian conflict mainly 
because of: (a) growing concerns over the participation of Russian speaking fighters on the 
side of anti-Assad forces; (b) intentions to prevent Western efforts to displace Assad (c) 
concerns that the fall of Assad's regime could lead to the spread of instability and radical 
Islamism in the post-Soviet space. 
3. From 2016 to nowadays. Russia recognizes the need to implement a new phase of 
diplomatic/economic relationships in the MENA region. Nowadays, Moscow is going to 
establish its largest hub of wheat exports in Syria thanks to a commercial agreement with 
the Syrian government. Setting up a Russian wheat export center in Syria towards the 
other countries in the region will be of strategic importance for the Russian agro-food 
economy.  
In relation to the latter issue, Russia’s companies are fully involved in the 
reconstruction and expansion of Syria’s ports by creating contemporaneously granaries in 
the port areas to store large volumes of Russian wheat. Furthermore, in the next years the 
country is starting to build new roads and railways to transport persons and goods (such 
as wheat) to the neighboring states. The geopolitical crises provoked by the disputes with 
the USA and EU on the activity in Syria and Ukraine had a key role in the diplomatic 
rapprochement process between Moscow and MENA countries; furthermore, the other 
driving forces at the origin of this process can be mainly ascribed to: 
1. The strategic (economic, commercial, and military) necessity aimed at improving 
relations with these countries. 
2. The need to create leverage to affect significantly the behavior of the USA and EU and 
mitigate the negative effects on the Russian economy, security and international relations 
caused by the ongoing confrontation between Moscow and the West (Kozhanov, 2018).  
3. Considerable differences between the current situation and the previous Russian 
attempts to build close relations with the Middle East. This difference is largely 
determined by the scale and intensity of Russia’s disagreements with the EU and USA 
(Connolly 2015). 
4. The current leadership regards that Russia, being a country that lies between Europe 
and Asia, shall diversify its political and economic diplomacy. This inevitably drags the 
Middle East into Russia’s sphere of interests. 
5. The results of Arab Spring. The Kremlin considered the Arab Spring at least partially as 
USA and EU plot; therefore, the Russian government felt it had no choice but to become 
more deeply involved in the case in order to balance the political situation and to prevent 
repercussions in Eurasia. 
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Of course, the Arab Spring affected the Russian economic interests in the MENA 
region, and this specific factor was the main driver which reshaped Moscow’s strategies in 
this area. During the Arab Spring, Russia sustained heavy economic losses (the total cost of 
which has not been determined yet) as illustrated in figure 16. 
 
   Figure 16: An example of the Russian economic losses after the Arab Spring. 
 
 
Finally, during the Medvedev’s presidency Russia did not put veto on the UN 
Security Council resolution allowing the US and EU intervention in Libya. After the failure 
of these pro-Western policies, which led to the deposition of Gaddafi and the 
destabilization of Libya, Russia had to reshape its approach to protect the country's 
economic interests also in the agro-food sector (Cerulli, 2019). 
 
Russia’s agro-food business in the MENA region 
 
Russia's competitiveness in the grain export towards MENA and other international markets 
During the last twenty years Russia’s agro-food sector and its grain industry enjoy 
significant competitive strengths. It has been highlighted that the agro-food sector can 
play a key role for the geopolitical influence that one nation could have over another one. 
It is remarkable how Russia authorities and business environment interpreted the function 
that an effective and well-organized agro-food sector might have in extending Moscow 
influence (together with the energy and military sectors) in a strategic area such as the 
MENA region.  
Since the early 2000s, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have emerged as the largest 
global suppliers of wheat with about 30% of global wheat trade (Kingwell, et al., 2016). As 
mentioned previously, Russia is the largest grain player in the Black Sea region, having 
surpassed its neighbors in economically, politically, and geographically. Ahmed et al., 
(2017) pointed out that the country improved step-by-step its position as a major player in 
the wheat global value chain (hereinafter, GVC). Russia is now the world’s largest 
supplier: during the period 2015-2019 the country supplied averagely 27 MT of wheat 
worldwide. Since late 2012 the export price of Russia's wheat had a downwards trend: 
from above $ 350/t to somewhat $ 200/t. Figure 17 data show the price shrinkage until 





Figure 17 - Russian milling wheat export prices (2012–16). 
 
Source: Abstracted from Apk-inform price data.              
 
During the season 2018-2019, wheat export prices reached their peak in the first half 
of February when some exporters offered grain (with 12.5% of protein content) at 250 and 
233 $/t at the ports of Black and Azov seas respectively. After this and until the end of the 
season the downward price trend prevailed (around $ 200/t) and there was some slight 
and short price rise (Timofeyeva, 2019). Throughout the 2019-2020 seasons (since the end 
of September) the prices started gradually increasing on the export market of wheat and 
accelerated highly in October. The prices were supported by strengthening of the RUR/$ 
parity and by the increase of the wheat prices on the global markets due to the harvest 
delays in the USA and Canada (because of the unfavourable weather conditions) and lack 
of rains in Argentina and Australia. During November the prices on this market did not 
move mostly, but in December they started to increase again due to the lowering of the 
wheat and corn production forecasts in Argentina, the further strengthening of the 
Russian currency and the rather stable demand of the key importers. Thus, by mid-
January the offer prices of wheat (with 12.5% protein content) in the Black Sea and Azov 
Sea ports reached 220-225 and 201-205$/t respectively. This trend did not change 
significantly throughout summertime (Timofeyeva, 2020). 
 
   
 
Russian wheat export prices breached the $300/t mark on 18 of January 2021, as concerns mount 
about “floating” export taxes, with sources expecting the uptrend in prices to continue in the near 
term (S&P Global Platts, 2021). Russia government confirmed in December 2020 it was imposing a 
wheat export tax and a grain quota export that will limit shipments to 17.5 MT, as the country 
looked to tackle domestic food inflation. The export quota mechanism is set to begin from 
February 15 through June 30, and cover wheat, corn, barley, and rye (the so-called ‘grain’). The 
export tax was initially announced at Euro 25/MT within the quota volume and 50% of the value, 
but not less than Eur100/MT outside of the quota (S&P Global Platts, 2021). However, the Russian 
Agriculture Ministry recently stated that it will start implementing a higher export tax from March 
and indicated the taxes may not be scaled back to zero when the new marketing season starts in 
July. This statement caused a price shockwave through the markets. The proposal to introduce a 
“floating tax” from July 1 (if confirmed) could impact next season’s trade, according to US-based 
advisory firm Agrivisor. As reported previously, to mitigate domestic food prices, the government 
increased the export tax within the quota to Euro 50/MT, that will come into effect on March 1. In 
this regard, S&P Global Plats Analytics and Sizov (2021) pointed out that the current situation of 
Russian grain market can be explained considering the following aspect: 
Box 3. The increase of Russia’s wheat prices as consequence of new introduced restrictions  
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1. Government move came despite a near record harvest during 2020-2021 marketing season (that 
runs from July 2020 to June 2021). Estimates, provided also by S&P Global Plats Analytics, stated 
that Russia will produce 81.5 MT of wheat in 2020-2021. However, concerns over the Russian 
winter crop following drought during the planting period began to add a bullish sentiment to the 
market. The global wheat market also tightened amid the COVID-19 pandemic and food security 
concerns, resulting in a flurry of international tenders. 
2. Wheat exports from Russia rose dramatically to satisfy the soaring demand, pushing prices from 
$197.50/MT in mid-August to more than $250/MT by October.  
3. A weakening Russian RUB, decrease in yields for numerous crops, and an increase in global 
food prices, also contributed to the rise in domestic food prices. 
4. Surging domestic food prices created an uneasiness within Russia, forcing the government to 
initiate the export curb policies. 
 
Before the season 2020-2021, at price close to $200/t it has been possible to profitably 
grow wheat in Russia (Kingwell et al. 2017). Until now, this aspect has been particularly 
important considering that the international price of wheat being at very low prices is still 
putting significant competitive pressure on wheat exporters in higher-cost regions: USA, 
Australia, and Canada. During the last twenty years, Russia’s ability to supply large 
quantities of low-cost wheat and the MENA region’s reliance on steady supply of cheap 
imported wheat, represent a relevant driving force of their trade relationship. 
Accordingly, strategic countries such as Turkey and Egypt are currently the principal 
buyers of Moscow’s wheat. Turkey, having a well-organized and the largest in the world 
flour milling industry, has great financial benefits from purchasing cheap Russian wheat. 
Indeed, in the last seven years (2012-2019) it has been the world leader in flour exports to 
over a third of the world market and it looks like this will continue throughout 2021. The 
country’s location providing easy access to raw materials, markets and logistics 
opportunities helps Turkey to reach this significant increase. In Box 4 are reported the 
main aspects of the Turkish milling industry and its commercial relationships with 
Russia’s wheat sector (considering that Turkey during the period 2019-2020 emerged as a 
major Russian wheat importer).   
 
 
In 2020, Turkey has emerged as a key player in the international wheat market as imports 
increased to records level. Lower production and higher domestic consumption increased 
government imports to stabilize domestic prices and an explosion in the export of wheat-based 
products. Domestic wheat consumption in Turkey increased by 1%, in the season 2019-2020 
(compared to the previous one) reaching about 20.0 million metric tons. The majority went into 
human consumption products such as flour and pasta with the balance used as stock-feed. Wheat-
based products’ consumption has increased dramatically in recent years for several reasons such 
as: (a) nowadays, has a population of 81 million people, with a yearly growth rate of 1.2%; (b) the 
country is currently hosting about 5 million refugees, double what it was only three years ago, and 
they are highly reliant on basic staples such as bread; (c) the Turkish economy has been faltering in 
recent times with per capita income falling for the past two years; (d) the latter issue combined 
with a reduction in purchasing power due to a devaluing Lira, has forced the population to 
increase consumption of wheat-based products at the expense of protein. Turkey, despite being 
close to wheat self-sufficiency, is expected to import around 10.5 million tonnes, predominantly 
from Russia, by the end of the current marketing year: an annual increase of 61% (Grain Brokers 
Australia, 2020). Thus, Russia became the leading supplier of milling wheat to Turkey with 4.8 
million tonnes imported so far in this marketing year. In fact, so far Turkey surpasses Egypt as 
Russia's biggest wheat export customer in the 2020-21 seasons. The strategic partnership between 




the Russian wheat sector and the Turkish milling industry will certainly last for a long period 
considering also that Turkey has increased its flour exports twofold and pasta exports more than 
sixfold in the last decade. Indeed, Turkey is now the world’s largest flour semolina and cracked 
wheat exporter and second-largest pasta exporter (Grain Brokers Australia, 2020). With import 
policies guided by downstream export demand, it is typical for Turkey’s imports to mirror its 
exports in terms of total wheat-equivalent. However, throughout the period 2019-2020, imports are 
expected to substantially exceed exports as production has been less than domestic demand, and 
the government has been actively increasing wheat reserves. According to Turkey's agriculture 
and forestry minister, international wheat trade generated US$12.5 billion profit for the Turkish 
economy in the last 17 years. While Turkey imported 63.7 million tonnes of wheat worth US$17.4 
billion between 2002 and 2019, the country exported 75.7 million tonnes of wheat and wheat-based 
products such as flour, pasta, and biscuits worth US$29.9 billion (Grain Brokers Australia, 2020). 
The last six months of 2020 showed a slowdown for all wheat product exports. This latter issue has 
been related to additional COVID-19 pandemic measures at the Turkish borders, which ensured 
safety for workers but slowed down the rate of shipments.  
 
Egypt is the other Russian strategic commercial partner. Focusing on the wheat 
sector, Egypt relies on the Russian participation in the General Authority for Supply 
Commodities (GASC) tender process to ensure that Egyptians could access affordable 
wheat-based products. This aspect is particularly important considering that more than 40 
million Egyptian enjoy governmentally subsidized wheat. Furthermore, although Russia is 
one of the cheapest sources of wheat (mainly due to the devaluation of the rouble), its 
recent history of occasional wheat export bans has induced Egypt to seek alternative 
partners for its wheat imports, such as Ukraine or even the EU. Considering Russia’s past 
with wheat export restrictions, Egyptian policymakers and the GASC hierarchy are 
cautious not to jeopardize their food security by relying solely on Russian wheat (Kingwell 
et al., 2016). However, in the last twenty years there has been a continuous dominance of 
Russian wheat on GASC tenders.  The commercial relationships between Cairo and 
Moscow especially since the second half of 2000s, has grown particularly solid also in 
many other economic sectors (defence, energy, high-tech industries, education and 





In terms of bilateral Egyptian-Russian relations, Russia is one of Egypt’s largest trading partners. 
Trade exchange between Egypt and Russia has achieved remarkable growth in 2018, reaching $ 
7.66 billion, while Egypt’s exports to Russia increased by 4.1% in 2018 to reach $ 526.4 million 
compared to $ 505.6 million in 2017. This is due to the increase in Egyptian exports of agricultural 
crops as well as industrial commodities, especially pharmaceutical products and food and 
chemical industries. However, Egypt aspires to a greater increase in Egyptian exports to ease the 
large trade deficit between the two countries. On the economic side, the Russian Industrial Zone 
project in the Suez Canal Economic Zone is Russia’s first off-shore project. The Russian capital in 
the infrastructure projects of the project amounted to $190 million, while the expected investment 
is about $ 7 billion. Until now, about 55 Russian companies have expressed their keen in investing 
in this project, which will create about 150,000 jobs. Both countries have agreed to finance and 
supply 1,300 railway wagons to develop the railway sector in Egypt and discuss joint 
manufacturing steps for these wagons, as well as ways of enhancing cooperation and coordination 
between Egypt and Russia in African markets. On the bilateral level, the two countries signed on 
December 11th, 2017, an agreement to establish Egypt’s nuclear power project in Dabaa region. This 
project is the largest joint venture between Cairo and Moscow. It also helps in the transfer of 
advanced technology in this field, which Egypt needs in the framework of an integrated energy 




strategy that will make Egypt a regional and global centre for the production and circulation of 
energy (Egypt State Information Service, 2019). In November 2020, the Egyptian Minister of 
Industry and Trade met his Russian counterpart during the 13th session of the Egyptian-Russian 
Joint Ministerial Committee for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, hold in 
Moscow. The committee strengthened the already well-established cooperation between the two 
countries in various fields such as: trade, finance, industry, investment, energy, education, 
agriculture, information technology (IT), health, transportation and tourism. The Minister and 
other Egyptian officials stressed the importance of benefitting from the distinguished relations that 
bind the two countries in boosting economic relations, especially at the commercial and industrial 
levels, for the benefit of both Egyptian and Russian citizens. Minister Gamea explained also that 
the meeting reviewed the latest developments in the establishment of the Russian Industrial Zone 
in Egypt, which makes Egypt a focal point for the launch of Russian products to various global 
markets, especially the Middle East and Africa, noting that 32 Russian companies have announced 
their desire to establish projects in the region where it is planned to start work in the region. 
Furthermore, in September 2020, Russia started to establish a new industrial zone in the Suez 
Economic Zone, which is expected to attract $7 billion in new investments, according to new 
Russia’s ambassador to Egypt Georgy Borisenko. The ambassador indicated interest from Russian 
companies to invest in the industrial zone, which according to Egyptian government data will 
cover an area of 5.25 sq. km and provide 35,000 direct and indirect job opportunities, 90 percent of 
which will be filled by Egyptians. Project’s implementation will take 12 years with a 50-year 
usufruct agreement. Financing comes from the Russian export Centre and the Russian Central 
Bank. The special zone will enjoy advantages regarding taxes and customs duties on exports and 
imports, labour costs and fees for passage from Suez Canal, with the possibility of transferring all 
of the revenues and profits without requiring an Egyptian partner (Abu Zaid, 2020). According to 
the Russian embassy to Egypt, trade between the two countries reached $6.2 billion in 2019, 
making Russia one of the Egypt’s top 10 trade partners. As reported previously, since the early 
2000s Russian exports to Egypt increased significantly and in particular as regards wheat, 
minerals, oil, gas, cars railroad cars, timber, fats and oils, while Egyptian exports to the Eurasian 
country include agricultural products, food and chemicals. In this regard, major Russian 
companies (including oil companies Rosneft and Lukoil, and automobile company Lada) operate 
in Egypt. Russia’s Transmashholding (the largest manufacturer of locomotives and rail 
equipment), since 2019, has started supplying Egypt’s railway sector with 1,300 railroad cars. In 
general, Russia’s government is quite optimistic about a further improvement of the commercial 
relations amongst the two countries whereas the volume of investments in the field of oil and gas 
discovery, agro-food industries and mechanical engineering, are increasing significantly. 
 
Thus, no country better represents the closer commercial and political connection 
between Moscow and MENA than Egypt, who is still the main purchaser of Moscow’s 
grain accounting for around a quarter of Russian wheat exports.  Numerous studies show 
that MENA’s dependence on food imports will continue to grow and will reach about 63% 
of wheat supply by 2030 (Ahmed et al., 2017). Therefore, MENA will continue to import 
Russian grain, including wheat and processed products as well (Riabko, 2014; Sadler & 
Magnan, 2011).  
Recently, Russia intensified its commercial relationship also with Saudi Arabia. The 
interaction between these two countries showed several ups and downs, which can be 
explained by the constantly changing role and place of each country in the world as well 
as in the Middle East region. An overview of the current relationship status among Russia 








In February 2007 meetings with representatives of Saudi business community in Riyadh, President 
Putin noted that the two-way trade was at a very low level: (a) Russia accounted of just 0.2% of 
Saudi foreign trade at the start of 2016; (b) Russian export prevailed in the overall volume of 
bilateral trade, (c) Russian investments in the Saudi economy were insignificant, and Saudi Arabia 
did not invest in the Russian economy at all. So, in terms of economic and trade cooperation, since 
2007 (after several meetings between President Putin and the Saudi business community in 
Riyadh), the two countries decided to enhance the level of economic partnership. The policy of 
economic transformation and the establishment of an investment economy, envisaged in ‘Saudi 
Vision 2030’, helped to bilateral cooperation. The priorities reported in the ‘Saudi Vision’ include: 
(a) creating a more effective defence industry; (b) developing the mining and processing sectors, as 
well as infrastructure and civil engineering; (c) improving the financial sector, tourism, culture and 
sports; (d) improving the sustainability of the environment, water and agriculture. Russia has 
developed a sufficient regulatory framework to be involved in the implementation of ‘Saudi Vision 
2030’, considering that: (a) in November 1994 the General Agreement was concluded between the 
Government of the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the agreement on 
the intergovernmental commission for trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation was 
signed; (b) during President Putin visit in Riyadh in 2007, agreements were signed on energy 
production and processing, transport infrastructure, agriculture, nuclear power engineering and 
metallurgy (Kosach and Melkumyan, 2016). Thus it is possible to state that, after 2007, a new era as 
regards the economic cooperation amongst the two countries begun. As regards the agricultural 
cooperation, Russia in the last ten years has been able to pay attention to the sections of the ‘Saudi 
Vision’ that pertain to the agro-environmental protection and food security. As reported several 
times, Russia owns critical resources (land and water mainly). Thus, Russian companies, since 
2010, started to be involved in the export and production of farm products, making use of Saudi 
investments in Russia. The Kingdom, currently, imports grain (particularly wheat), cattle, sheep 
and goats, and dairy products. This enabled Saudi Arabia to save water resources. One example of 
this cooperation is SAHO-MENA, a joint venture established in 2012 by Siberian Agrarian Holding 
Group (Novosibirsk) and Saudi Najd Investments Ltd. (Dubai), which specialized in supplies of 
Russian grain. In view of this intense economic cooperation, in October 2019 a Russian delegation, 
led by President Putin and the Foreign Minister Lavrov arrived in Riyadh to sign a wide range of 
business agreements. The latter covered the fields of petroleum and other energy industries, space 
and satellite navigation, justice, health services, tourism, and agriculture. In this regard, the 
Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and the Saudi Agricultural and Livestock Investment 
Company signed an agreement to join forces in the search of investment projects in both Russian 
and Saudi Arabia agricultural sectors. Furthermore, during the same high-level meeting, the 
Minister of the Russian Federation and his homologue signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) on mutual increase of agricultural exports. As a result, the Russian Federation started to 
increase exports of all key agricultural products, such as grain (and in particular wheat), meats, 
feedstuffs and processed food. Until 2019, Saudi Arabia was only buying barley in Russia. In 
August 2020, the Saudi Grains Organizations (SAGO) started also to purchase wheat from 
Moscow. One of the main causes preventing export of Russian wheat to the Saudi market. One of 
the main causes preventing export of Russian wheat to the Saudi market was a requirement to 
complete the absence of grain damaged by corn-bug in supplied wheat lots. In April 2019, Russian 
specialists visited Saudi Arabia to check the quality of the domestic wheat, with specimens 
supplied as early as at the turn of 2018 and having different degree of grain damages. Finally, on 
April 9th 2020 a symbolic cargo of Russian wheat was set sail for Saudi Arabia from a Black Sea 
port. The first cargo, as confirmed by Russia’s agriculture safety watchdog, Rosselkhoznadzor, was 
of 60,000 tons. In this regard, Russia, looking to strengthen its position as a supplier to the Saudi 
Arabian market, sent a second shipment of wheat to the Gulf kingdom on May 14. As underlined 
several times by the Russian Minister of Agriculture Dmitry Patrushev, Russian companies are 
Box 6. Saudi Arabia and Russia and their recent cooperation in the agricultural sector 
34 
 
interested not only in increasing the volume of trade in traditional types of products but are also 
ready to expand the product line. In this regard Russia’s officials and agro-food entrepreneurs see 
also the following commodities/goods as great opportunities: (a) poultry; beef and mutton; (b) 
dairy and flour products; (c) confectionery. Several commercial agreements and memorandum 
regarding the mutual expansion of export of agricultural products have been signed, in particular 
on the occasion of the business forum “Partnership for Sustainable Development of Agriculture 
and Food Security” held in Riyadh on October 14, 2019. 
 
As regards Iran, the Islamic Republic is currently Russia’s third main wheat export 
market and Russia is Iran’s main source of wheat imports as well. Iran typically produces 
enough grain to supply its domestic market, but the grain processing sector depends 
heavily on imported raw materials22. So, Iran is still one of the world’s largest importers of 
grain (for example the Islamic Republic is the world’s third largest importer of barley after 
Saudi Arabia and China), and Russia still supplies a quarter of Iran’s imported raw 
materials. In February 2019, Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with 
Russia and Kazakhstan for cooperation in wheat trading. The document, which was 
signed in Moscow, brought the countries closer to the free trade zone between Iran and 
the Eurasian Economic Union, which Russia has established with its neighbors. Under the 
deal, Iran started to import wheat for its private millers who produce flour for export. The 
agreement was particularly important for Iran because it opened the gates to a big market 
for the Islamic Republic, alongside the opening of the Iranian market to Russia and the 
northern countries. 
Other countries within the MENA region rely on Russian wheat. During the period 
2017-2020, Russia’s foreign trade volumes to other nations such as Syria, Sudan, Kuwait 
and Tunisia rose twofold, and trade with Saudi Arabia increased three times. The quantity 
of Russian food products sold to the United Arab Emirates soared by 150%; 80% of these 
supplies are accounted for by grain. In this regard, it is important to analyze also the 
increasingly commercial relationships between Syria and Russia in the agro-food sector. 
Indeed, the agricultural sector in Syria before the beginning of the disruptive civil war 
contributed 19% of the national GDP. FAO estimated that losses in the Syrian agricultural 
sector have amounted to more than $16 billion dollars since the beginning of the civil war 
in 2011. There have been significant losses in harvests of the sector’s strategic crops such as 
wheat, which declined by 70 % over the last eight years, as well as cotton and animal feed. 
There is a significant strategic importance of the agricultural sector potential to re-
invigorate the trade between Syria and its neighbors. Previously, Syria exported citrus, 
vegetables and livestock to Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar. In this 
regard, Russia positioned itself to control strategic fields in Syria, taking an advantage of 
the decline of the Syrian wheat production and becoming the leading supplier of wheat to 
the country. The quantities of annual Russian wheat supply to Syria have increased 
steadily, going from 650,000 tons in 2015 to 1.2 million tons in 2017, and 1.5 million tons in 
2018 (Makieh, 2018). In 2019 and 2020 the quantities of wheat exported from Moscow to 
Damascus were almost the same as in 2018. Since 2015, Syria and Russia have increased 
the cooperation in the agricultural sector. This included the signing of agreements 
licensing the export of vegetable oil and fertilizers, as well as agreements to rehabilitate, 
 
22Iran’s officials noted that although the Islamic Republic has enough wheat to cover its needs it could export 
Russian and Kazakh grain to other countries. Indeed, Iranian private millers until signing the MoU were not 




build and manage flour mills, grain silos, and water treatment facilities (Makiek, 2018). 
Furthermore, Moscow has already signed with the Syrian government a 49 years contract, 
which foresees the implementation of a significant expansion of the port as well as 
modernization of the current infrastructure. In the same area, both countries are 
establishing a Russian wheat exports center for the other countries in the MENA region. 
Also Saudi Arabia has announced plans to become a major hub for Russian agricultural 
products in the Middle East.  
However, the above-mentioned Russia’s export tax on wheat has blunted the 
automatic price lead of Russian wheat. In relation to that, according to S&P Global Plats 
(2021), France is back in the “picture”, if one considers that GASC on February received a 
lowest offer of $293.75/MT for 60,000 tonnes of French wheat in an international purchase 
tender. GASC is seeking an unspecified quantity of wheat for shipment March 15-30, 
tapping the international market for grain for the first time since key exporter Russia 
introduced an export tax of $60.18/MT of wheat to go into effect from the start of March 
(Hellenic Shipping, 2021). This event is particularly significant because, as already noted, 
the agency typically buys majority of its wheat from Russia. With Russian wheat unlikely 
to be competitive, opportunities are expected to emerge for other exporters to compete for 
the market, according to analysts. Melikian (2021) recently lowered her estimates for the 
country's 2020-21 wheat exports by 1 million MT to 37.5 million MT, citing the impact of 
the export duty.  
 
The importance of logistic for the Russian grain industry development and the MENA markets 
The world’s largest country inevitably needs an extensive transport and logistics 
network. Stretching across 17.1 million square km, larger than the surface area of Pluto, 
Russia is truly vast (Kingwell et al., 2017). To service its 140 million inhabitants with up-to-
the-minute goods and services, air, sea, road and rail logistics are in high demand. As 
mentioned previously, Russia’s continent-straddling size is both a blessing and a curse. 
Indeed, despite the existing transport links, Russia ranks 99 out of 160 countries in terms 
of logistics performance. In 2018, the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index ranks 
Russia far lower than other comparable economies such as Germany (1st) and the United 
Kingdom (6th)23. However, current low logistics performance does not close off 
investment avenues. Rather, it points towards some golden opportunities. Russia needs 
modern technologies, methodologies and attitudes when it comes to transport. In section 
2, some aspects regarding the Black Sea’s ports strategic relevance have been outlined. 
This is to say that, notwithstanding a relevant infrastructural gap with the most 
industrialised countries, the Eurasian country is an intermodal hotspot with a significant 
room for expansion. With over 86,000 kilometres in rail track (Figure 18), a road network 
over 1.4 million kilometres long, plus countless air and seaports, Russia is a well-
established intermodal network hub. Domestic suppliers vie with international companies 
















The Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation on the Issues of 
Environment and Transport, Sergey Ivanov, estimated the market’s potential at $150 
billion. Fresh warehousing stock is in demand as well as modernized cargo handling 
facilities at ports, new airports, rail hubs and logistics centres to match the government's 
ambitions. Foreign companies are well placed to aid the development of Russia’s transport 
and logistics sector.  
The analysis of Russia’s transportation system displays that its overall conditions 
close to Black Sea ports are good enough. For example, all the major ports either in the 
Azov or Black Sea are well connected with the national railway and road system, which is 
good for Russia’s grain industry ambitions to keep its key role in the MENA agricultural 
markets. 
From the logistics point of view, there are several positive aspects of the Russian 
grain sector and its commercial relationships with the MENA region countries: (a) the 
grain agricultural area and production is close to the two biggest wheat importers: Egypt 
and Turkey (Figure 2); (b) the majority of the total wheat production comes from regions 
close to several Black Sea ports; (c) Russian ports are a mixture of deep-water ports, which 
can load vessels for distant markets, and shallow-water ports on the Sea of Azov loading 
smaller coasters to ship small parcels to closer markets in the Mediterranean (Wallack, 
2018); (d) grain land freight costs in Russia are not too high as most grain is transported by 
trucks over short haul distances (Kingswell et al., 2017). Proximity to the MENA markets 
provides a significant advantage in shipping rates and time for the Russian grain. For 
example, the time to ship from Novorossiysk into Egypt is about 3.8 days compared with 
25 days from Newcastle, Australia.  
All governments, even the most powerful, must deal with specific issues 
characterizing each economic sector; from this point of view Russia’s grain sector does not 
make an exception. For example, the Black sea is strategic for exporting large volumes of 
agricultural commodities in the MENA region, but the transportation of grain from the 
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Black Sea to Siberia and then to China, or to Vladivostok and then its placement on the 
Asian market requires too much time because of the distance (almost 5000km) and in 
general the quality of infrastructures. Thus, grain produced away from the Black Sea is 
therefore steeply discounted in view of the costs involved in transporting it to the port 
(Kingswell et al., 2017). 
Thus, despite the presence of major ports such as Vladivostock, the Far-East area of 
Russia compared to the Black Sea Region shows significant lacks in terms of sophisticated 
transport services. In this regard, the government has already approved the so-called 
‘Long-term Strategy for the Development of the Grain Complex until 2035’. According to 
the document, the priorities for the development of the sector should be: (a) grain 
production increase and quality improvement; (b) scientific and technical support 
improvement; (c) infrastructure and logistics development. The implementation of the 
strategy will require additional investments in the industry in the amount of over 4.4 
trillion roubles using private investment funds, bank lending, as well as targeted 
financing. 
Focusing on the logistic issues, the plan (especially for the Far-East area) takes into 
account the expansion of the volume of port elevators and capacity of trans-shipment 
complexes, the carrying capacity of the port railway stations, access roads and highways, 
and the development of the route sending system. 
It is expected that the total grain storage capacity will be increased from 156.9 million 
tons in 2018 to 167.4 million tons by 2035. The total investment in the development of 
infrastructure and transport and logistics support of the grain sector for 2019-2035 at 2018 
prices will amount to 281.4 billion roubles. According to the results of the implementation 
of the proposed measures, the share of infrastructure costs in the cost of grain is expected 
to decrease significantly by 2035 (Russian Ministry of Agriculture, 2019). 
As regards the governmental financial support, during the last two years the VTB (a 
state bank) has increased its investments in the grain export business; in fact, the bank 
loaded up on assets including port terminals, rail-freight operator and trader. According 
to Medetsky and Khrennikova (2019), those investments could be worth about 1.5 USD 
billion. The buying spree means that VTB handless a fifth of the Russian grain exports; in 
relation to that, the bank in March 2019 has agreed to buy the grain terminal of the 
country’s busiest port: the terminal from the Novorossiysk port in southern Russia, which 
was majority-owned by state oil pipeline monopoly Transneft.  
Through this deal the bank gained a significant control over the grain exports. In the 
same period VTB took over a 50% minus one share stake in the United Grain Company, a 
major grain trading company. The VTB (and government) strategy is clear: since Russia is 
a large agriculture products exporting country, the transport logistics in the grain industry 
is a strategic growing business in need of relevant financial support. 
 
Russia’s grain sector: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and potential threats  
In the previous sections were outlined several positive aspects of Russia’s grain and 
agricultural sector, above all the availability of huge agricultural areas suitable to cultivate 
several types of crops and in particular grain. In this section will be analyzed more factors, 
which can be double-edged, that is both strength and a weakness of the Russian agro-food 
setting, in relation also to the commercial relationships between the Eurasian country and 
the MENA region.  
As regards the double-edged factors, hereinafter the most relevant are outlined: 
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1. Agro-holdings. This type of agricultural enterprises was established in the early 2000s. 
As mentioned previously, they are vertically-integrated enterprises combining different 
production stages, such as: (a) primary agriculture; (b) processing; (c) distribution; (d) and 
sometimes retail sale. As regards the pros and cons of agro-holdings, during these years 
there has been a wide debate amongst economists and sociologists. As concerns the cons, 
Liefert and Liefert (2012) pointed out that these agro-holdings, being the result of a process 
by which financial and/or energy companies diversify their investments’ portfolio, are the 
result of: (a) the acquisition of a number of existing farms; (b) the improvement of farms’ 
efficiency by cutting waste and other costs; (c) the transformation of these agro-farms into 
more profit-oriented and efficient producers. The agro-holdings’ top administration brings 
investment, superior technology, and better management practices into the entire agro-
food system. Thus, agro-holdings’ managers very often introduce relevant agro-technical 
tools (for making farm’s activity more efficient) such as: (a) higher quality seeds; (b) 
agricultural machineries; (c) and animal breeding stock. Although the data are not firm, 
the agro-holdings currently control between 15-20% of the Russian arable land. Vertically-
integrated enterprises resembling agro-holdings also appear to have been the driving force 
in the 2000s behind the emergence of large, modern meat-producing enterprises, 
especially in the poultry and pork industries (FAO 2009). The agro-holdings magnitude 
and vertical integration can be seen as a protective response to the deficient infrastructure 
(physical, commercial, and institutional), high transaction costs, market concentration, and 
other forms of organized power that trouble Russian agriculture (Liefert and Liefert, 2012). 
A study carried out by Schierhorn et al. (2014) showed that agro-holdings using state-of 
the-art agricultural production techniques and equipment, enabled efficient production of 
high-quality grain. Furthermore, a range of governmental programs, including subsidies 
on inputs and internet rates, support grain production in Russia. An increased upgrade of 
and additional investment in grain storage and port infrastructure in the country will 
accommodate larger crops. As regards the cons Visser (2017) indicated that empirical 
evidences showed also that the agro-holdings approach (in the mid-long term period) can 
bring many problems within the rural socio-economic context of nations like Russia, and 
in particular: (a) land appropriation (b) growing rural inequality (b) unemployment 
(though it depends very much on the type of agro-holding); (c) negative environmental 
effects (such as soil degradation). At the same time, there is a range of problems that large-
scale farms face. These problems include but are not limited to large financial debts, 
financial volatility, and difficulties in finding sufficiently qualified employees. 
2. Geography. Previously, it has been mentioned that Russia’s total arable area as well as 
its location are close to the intersection of Europe, Asia, and in particular MENA region, 
which creates an advantage. The magnitude and potentialities of the Russian agricultural 
sector is summarized by the following numbers: Russia has 122m ha of arable land, which 
account for around 10 per cent of the total global. Indeed, much of it remained abandoned 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Due to the large land area, the Eurasian country’s 
farmers can grow, for example, spring and winter wheat and a range of other crop types. 
Of course, this portfolio of crops can provide biological and industrial resilience for the 
Russian grain sector and in particular the wheat industry. It has been already mentioned 
that Russia’s strategic position brings some powerful competitive strengths at the table, 
especially as regards its significant grain export capability from the Black Sea ports 
towards MENA region at significant lower freight cost compared to the competing grain 
from Canada, USA and Australia. However, the Eurasian country’s vast size at the same 
time affects its commercial activity. For example, Russia can potentially supply grain to 
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China (and certain eastern European neighbors) without the need for ocean freight. As 
indicated in the previous paragraphs, grain can be exported theoretically from the 
Vladivostok port to the large and lucrative Chinese, Korean and Japanese markets. 
However, at the moment Vladivostok's potential use remains dormant probably due to 
Russia’s grain production centers locations, all of which are positioned thousands of 
kilometers away from Vladivostok. Therefore, the cost of rail freight makes Vladivostok's 
grain export mostly uncompetitive. Even if grain production moves eastwards, the costs of 
land development and provision of required infrastructure and services are potentially 
wasteful investments, especially given the likelihood of low grain prices over the next 
handful of years. So Russia’s competitors (mainly Australia) should not fear a possible 
connection of Vladivostok to key Far East markets because the grain transport costs for 
such an enormous distance are impractically high (Kingwell et al, 2017). 
3. Geopolitics. It can be considered a “double-edged sword”, in particular the military 
power of Russia and its effectiveness in serving the country's national interests. For 
example, Russia’s army efficiency has allowed the Eurasian country to assert its control of 
Crimea, which was part of Ukraine under international law. The Crimea’s conquest 
undoubtedly represented a winning move for the further development of Russia’s 
agricultural power. The Eurasian country now exerts a direct control over the grain 
production in Crimea and has unimpeded use of its ports. Furthermore, this move has 
allowed Russia to disrupt the grain production in eastern Ukraine, noting that Ukrainian 
grain exports directly compete against Russian grain exports (Kingswell et al., 2017). With 
the military diplomatic support provided to Syria’s government, which relies strategically 
on hard power and tough diplomacy, Russian grain exports are increasingly flowing to 
Syria. In addition, closer trade ties with Iran are being formed as the Shi’a religious base in 
Iran opposes the Sunni-based forces active in neighboring Syria. However, border 
incidents between Russia and Turkey had been an unanticipated consequence of the 
support provided to Assad's regime, which has jeopardized Russia’s trade with Turkey 
(Kingswell et al., 2017). The militaristic stance of Russia brought also some substantial 
adverse ramifications, such as: (a) the Russian occupation of Crimea and its subsequent 
involvement in the Eastern Ukraine conflict have forced several Western nations to impose 
economically harmful sanctions against Russia; (b) Russia decision to ban agricultural 
imports from the countries that pushed it towards cost inflation and decline in living 
standards; (c) Western nations’ support for Ukraine, which includes funding to improve 
Ukraine’s grain sector cost-efficiency, thereby adding to competitive pressures on Russian 
grain exports.  
In recent years Russia’s agro-food and grain sectors are strengthened by many 
advantages empowering the country's position as a wheat exporter: 
1. Closeness of agricultural areas to strategic grain importing countries. As mentioned, 
Russian wheat production is close to Egypt and Turkey that are two of the world largest 
wheat importing markets. A large production of Russia’s wheat comes from regions 
adjacent to several Black Sea ports. In this context, grain land freight costs in Russia are 
not too high as most grain is transported by trucks over short haul distances.  
2. Characteristics of Russian ports. In the section focused on logistics, it has been 
described that Russian ports are a mixture of deep-water ports (loading huge-size vessels 
for distant markets) and shallow-water ports on the Sea of Azov (loading smaller coasters 
to ship small parcels by affordable prices to closer markets in the Mediterranean). In 
addition, these shallow-water ports allow buyers to target quality wheat in smaller 
parcels. Another reason for Russia’s increasing supremacy in the grain sector is that 
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compared to the EU, US, Canada and Australia, the Eurasian country has relatively low 
agricultural land values and low cost of grain production.  
3. Wheat qualitative characteristics. From the agronomic point of view, it is possible to 
state that the medium-protein hard wheat produced in Russia is ideally suited to Middle-
Eastern flat breads, which is well combined with the country’s proximity to these markets.  
4. Rouble weakness. Within this frame of reference, it must be mentioned that the rouble 
weakness ensures free on board (FOB) grain prices, which makes grain production 
relatively profitable in Russia. The sharp devaluation of rouble started since the financial 
crisis in 2014-2015; indeed, a decline in confidence in the Russian economy caused 
investors to sell off their Russian assets, which led to a decline in the value of the Russian 
rouble and sparked fears of a potential Russian financial crisis. Notwithstanding some 
slight appreciation of the rouble during the 2019-2020 season, Russia was again the world 
leader as regards grain exports. Indeed, in crop year 2019-2020, Russia exported almost 42 
MT of cereals. This was approximately three million metric tons lower than the volume of 
Russia’s cereal exports recorded in the previous years. The 2019-20 export total includes 
34.2 MT of wheat, 5.1 million tonnes of barley and 3.9 million tonnes of corn, according to 
SovEcon.   
Despite the several strength points, Russia’s agro-food system and in particular its 
grain industry are also characterized by some weaknesses, which can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. The Black Sea factor. As mentioned, the Black Sea is Russia’s only viable route for 
exporting significant volumes of grains. In this regard, figure 21 clearly indicates that any 
effort to export wheat produced in Siberia means a 4800km journey west to the Black Sea 
or the same distance east to Vladivostok. Grain produced away from the Black Sea is 
therefore steeply discounted in view of the costs involved in bringing it to port (Kingwell 
et al., 2017). 
2. Low suitability for Western countries milling sector. Russian wheat has a relatively 
poor reputation for producing Western-style breads and Asian noodles, so there is little 
chance of displacing US, Canadian, and Australian in premium Asian markets. 
3. Low supply stability. Considering that Russia will always prioritize affordable food 
availability for its citizens, stability of supply cannot be used as a selling point. Under 
certain conditions countries with delicately balanced food security can be reticent to rely 
on the unstable Russian supply to fulfill their wheat importation requirements.  
4. Inappropriateness of the Russian grain sector for the development of medium/small 
agriculture enterprises’ business. Many small-to-medium-sized farms in Russia are 
forced to sell off their grain. Inadequate and inferior on-farm grain storage, price inflation 
and inability to access price risk management tools force many farmers to sell at or near 
harvest. 
In relation to the potential opportunities, we have to consider: 
1. Infrastructures’ improvement. Russia needs gradual improvements in logistics 
infrastructure to achieve economic viability for the grain production located in the 
agricultural areas at greater distance from the nearest export terminal. This potential could 
be used if massive tracts of agricultural land for grain production are eventually unlocked 
(Saraykin et. al., 2014). 
2. The potential of Siberia's proximity to China. The border shared with China should 
increasingly create opportunities for cross-border trade out of Siberia and other parts of 
the country without close access to ports. 
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3. Climate change benefits. Projected climate change may create large swathes of newly 
arable land in Russia (Kiselev et al., 2013). 
4. Improvement of public scientific research institutions’ efficiency. Government’s 
decision and actions to restructure the public scientific research institutions in Russia are 
likely to improve the efficiency and outcomes of research in Russia. Grain production will 
ultimately benefit from improvements in the organisation of agricultural science in Russia. 
For example, better-quality varieties with improved yields are likely to further strengthen 
the grain production. 
 
Conclusion 
Since the early 2000s the Russian agro-food sector and in particular its wheat 
production have increased greatly. Indeed quantitative data undeniably show that 
currently Russia is one of the world’s top-ranked exporters of a strategic commodity such 
as wheat: a significant step-forward if one would think about the country’s overwhelming 
economic conditions after the collapse of the Berlin wall and the end of the communist 
regime. The renaissance of the Russian agro-food sector is a result of a range of factors: 
1. Russia has sizeable areas of fertile, arable land and nearby wheat markets in Egypt, 
Turkey, Iran and other MENA countries. In this regard, as pointed out in this study, 
Russia’s main southern wheat-producing region has ready access to nearby ports ensuring 
that their supply chain costs are far lower than those in USA, Canada or some inland parts 
of Australia (Kingwell et al., 2017). In the previous sections, it has been accounted for that 
the geographical proximity of Russia’s agricultural area to the MENA region is not the 
only reason for the positive results of the country's agricultural export. In the last ten years 
Russia has claimed this position by making well-focused strategic-geopolitical choices: (a) 
the Crimea’ annexation, which allowed the country to consolidate its dominance in the 
Black Sea “region” referring also to the agricultural trade activities extension in the MENA 
countries thanks to the strategic position of the Sevastopol port; (b) the military 
intervention in Syria in September 2015, which must be interpreted as a vast strategy of 
Moscow to control (economically, military and politically) all the Middle East (or MENA 
region). 
2. During the last ten years, Russian companies' capacity to export agro-food commodities 
and in particular wheat in several MENA countries confirms Moscow's leading role in the 
agro-food sector, especially its ability trade with the Middle East area. This trend is 
supported by several factors, which could be listed as follows: 
• Russian superpower. Russian wheat production and other crop productions witnessed 
significant growth in the past ten years. The government’s decision to impose food 
import ban on the Western countries in the wake of the economic sanctions forced on 
the Eurasian country after the annexation of Crimea, played an important role; indeed, 
this ban encouraged farmers to increase the domestic production. Furthermore, 
together with the previous production surges, Russia was able to increase significantly 
its wheat export capabilities in the last period. In the period 2015-2020, Russia exported 
33 million metric tons of wheat on average (Figure 19) according to USDA (2020).  
 




Figure 19 - Russian Federation wheat exports per year 
 
         Source: USDA and Index Mundi, 2020 
 
3. Regional shift. Local wheat production in several MENA countries is still unable to 
meet the domestic demand forcing these countries to rely on wheat suppliers around the 
world to bridge the gap between domestic production and consumption. Russia has 
sizeable areas of fertile, arable land and large nearby markets in all MENA countries and 
especially in Egypt and Turkey. In this regard, it has been pointed out that Russia’s main 
southern grain-producing regions have ready access to nearby ports ensuring that their 
supply chain costs are lower than those in Canada, USA or some inland parts of eastern 
Australia. This makes the Russian wheat prices more attractive to buyers from the region 
considering that, for example, the cost of its export without shipping is USD 100 per ton 
(according to some estimates) compared with about USD 146 for Australian wheat. 
4. Economic presence. As stated previously, Russia’s intervention in Syria helped the 
Eurasian country to play a greater military and political role in the MENA region, and 
thereby to enhance its economic presence in the region. It means that in several MENA 
countries Moscow’s economic presence has been evident through the direct involvement 
of companies operating in the energy, agriculture and logistic sector. During these years, 
Russia appeared to the majority of the Middle East countries as a reliable partner able to 
support the government offering a political and economic partnership. This is the case 
with Syria, where Moscow increased step-by-step its own geo-economic interests. For 
example, in September 2017 the Syrian government signed a three-year agreement for 
purchase of 3 million metric tons of Russian wheat in order to cover possible risks that 
might affect wheat supplies. It is a move that boosts the Russian economic interests on the 
Syrian market. Furthermore, Russia is currently trying to expand its presence especially in 
the grain sector of other countries that have a strong commercial connection with Ukraine, 
France and USA. This is the case of Morocco and Saudi Arabia, where Russian grain 
companies supported by the government signed commercial agreements to supply wheat 
to both countries.    
Of course, Russia's geo-economic expansion in the MENA region meets potential 
obstacles, which may hinder Moscow’s wheat supplies to the Middle East in the future. 
Among these the most relevant are: 
Average wheat export 2015-2020= 33, 3 million metric tons 
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1. The instability of political relations between Russia and some countries in the region. 
An example of such instable political relations is the tension between Russia and Turkey in 
late 2015, which impeded wheat trade between both countries for several months. Besides, 
there are other several trends which suggest temporary economic interests between Russia 
and some countries in the region. In this regard, the economic and political relationship 
between Russia and Iran represents a classic example of temporary interest. Collaboration 
between Teheran and Moscow in the political, economic, and military arenas has 
increased substantially in recent years. In the economic field, Russia is trying to help Iran 
after the USA enforced embargoes against it and has been praised by Iran for its 
assistance. However, by doing so the Russians are also securing their own economic 
interests in the Middle East in several sectors (including the agro-food sector). In fact, 
despite areas of collaboration, Iran is well aware that Russia is not driven by a desire to see 
an overly strong and independent Iran. The Iranian political establishment agrees on the 
fact that the country will not have a fully support of Russia in the event of a war with the 
USA. Indeed, as reported by several Iranian analysts, Russia would be primarily interested 
in securing its own interests24. Perhaps partly because of Iran’s fears that Russia will not 
remain committed to their alliance, Teheran is increasing its cooperation with China in a 
way to definitely unsettle Russia and gain an advantage in their future discussions and 
negotiations25.  
2. The fluctuation of Russia’s domestic policies. The government continues to 
monopolize some value chain segments (such as transportation) and intervenes in the 
sector to support national interests (Ahmed et al., 2017). Policy interventions can 
discourage foreign investments and affect trade’s efficiency. Thus, as Russia increases its 
share on the wheat market, it must improve the policy environment and implement 
policies capable to make the wheat sector and in general the agro-food sector even more 
competitive at international level. For example, since transportation policies are 
considered strategic for the opening of new remunerative markets for Russian agro-food 
companies, it is necessary to tackle the inadequate transport infrastructure issue; the latter 
is preventing the country from capitalizing on economic opportunities, particularly with 
Asian partners such as China, Japan and South Korea. Without sustained and systematic 
improvements of the region’s transport networks, and particularly railways, bridges and 
ports, the Kremlin will be unable to attract the foreign investment needed to boost freight 
capacity and support export growth. Despite the announced modernization of 
infrastructures (see box 1), currently the implementation of the public projects and the 
public budget spending modalities are not yet completely clear. During the last ten years, 
the country implemented trade policies to protect domestic wheat supplies and to tackle 
internal food inflation: (a) after a severe drought (in 2010) that devastated the region’s 
wheat harvest, Russia banned all wheat exports for 6 months; (b) as a result of the Crimea 
 
24In an article published on the reformist news website Entekhab, based on reports from the Russian media, it 
was stated that in the case of a war between Iran and the U.S., Russia will not only occupy Georgia to stop 
the U.S. from establishing military bases in the area, but will also occupy the other countries in the Caucasus. 
The conservative Baztab news website, which has close links to Mohsen Rezaei, a former senior commander 
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, also citing Russian media, wrote that even though the Russians 
have no desire to get involved in a war between Iran and the U.S., they will ultimately side with Iran. 
25For Iran, however, a triangular alliance with Russia and China would be the ultimate victory against U.S. 
alliances in the region. In regard to the recent joint Iranian-Russian-Chinese naval drill, the Iranian hard-line 
newspaper Kayhan wrote, “The alliance of Iran, China, and Russia is the formation of a ‘new maritime 
power triangle’ and a display of power to Americans and their European and regional allies.” 
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crisis and consequent international sanctions that caused a surge in domestic food prices 
and the devaluation of the rouble. In relation to the latter issue, Russia has imposed a high 
tax on wheat exports essentially ending all shipments. These trade disruptions have 
significant implications for importing countries that are reliant on Russian wheat and 
often push these nations to purchase more expensive wheat from alternative partners 
(Ahmed et al., 2017). In addition, the Russian wheat quality may not be sufficient to attract 
some buyers from the MENA region. That happened recently between Russia and Egypt 
(with GASC excluding Russia from its tender process because Moscow could not 
guarantee stable quantities of the agricultural commodity) as well as with Iran that, as 
aforementioned, in 2016 suspended wheat import from Russia and then in 2019 signed a 
new memorandum of understanding with Moscow and Kazakhstan for cooperation in 
wheat trading. 
Trade relation with Russia and wheat exports contribute to food security around the 
world, especially import-dependent regions like MENA. In the last decade, countries 
belonging to this area have increased their reliance on Russian wheat imports and are 
therefore vulnerable to price and supply fluctuations that occur in the country. MENA's 
import dependence on food products will continue to increase the region's vulnerability to 
global food price shocks (Wright & Cafiero, 2010). 
Wheat price will remain the main determinant in wheat purchases for a region 
experiencing modest regional macroeconomic outlook and reduced oil revenues, as well 
as fiscal deficits and high public debt. The inflationary impact on vulnerable populations 
could potentially spark unrests in a region that remains unstable, with persisting conflicts 
in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen (Devarajan & Mottaghi, 2015; World-Bank, 2012). 
Therefore, in the next decades it is important that Russia continues to deliver as much as 
possible steady quantities of wheat to these countries with qualitative characteristics 
compliant to the requests of the local milling industry. In this regard, the reform26of the 
wheat breeding sector implemented by Putin in 2013 to spread the use of registered and 
certified wheat varieties (about 20% of registered varieties are harvested on 80% of the 
wheat area and varieties have long cycles of use, 13–15 years) is starting to give some 
results (Kingwell et al., 2017).  
As pointed out several times during this study, Russia and its Black Sea neighbors 
such as Ukraine form the most important wheat-exporting region in the globe, being 
responsible for about 30% of the global wheat exports. Thus, any changes in the wheat 
production in Russia, and more in general in the Black Sea region, due to climate, 
technology, politics or policy, have the capacity to greatly influence the international 
wheat trade (Kingwell et al., 2017). 
 
26After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences (RAAS), which today 
is responsible for Russia’s plant breeding program. The RAAS belongs to the Russian Academy of Sciences 
(RAS). The Ministry of Education provides a steady stream of trained scientists, including plant breeders 
and geneticists. However, this model operates under significant operational and financial constraints. A 
restrictive budget limits their ability to hire enough graduates and post-graduates to provide the functions 
critical to any plant-breeding program. Russian wheat breeding has therefore lacked the resources for critical 
functions, such as the technical extension activities necessary for facilitating adoption of new varieties. In 
2013 President Putin lost established changes causing the RAS to report to a newly formed federal 
department, which in turn reported directly to him. This new oversight arm of government ensured the 
Academy’s US$1.9bn annual budget was directed in areas of maximum benefit. It is too early to draw any 
conclusions regarding the implications of these changes for wheat breeding, which is only one small part of 




Thus, although Russian wheat supplies constitute an important figure in Moscow’s 
exports to the Middle East countries, there are major variables, which may impact their 
level in the forthcoming years. These variables are not confined only to the fluctuation of 
political relations between Russia and some countries in the region but are extended also 
to the internal socio-economic and political transformation in Moscow. 
This shall be of particular importance if the Eurasian country wishes to maintain its 
key role in the MENA region. The government needs to implement as soon as possible the 
list of national projects (see box 1) having in mind that the expenditure in most areas is 
behind schedule. To a large extent, the 85 Russian “federal subjects” (regions) shall be 
responsible for the implementation; however, many of the latter are struggling to meet 
their share of the financing, and a majority of them are sceptical regarding the feasibility of 
the projects. Doubts have been expressed also on the economic viability of mega-projects 
such as the high-speed Moscow-Kazan railway, or a proposed 10-kilometre bridge linking 
the far eastern island of Sakhalin to the mainland (Russel, 2019). 
Aside from state-led investments through national projects, Russia is having trouble 
to attract the foreign and domestic investment needed for the modernization of the 
economy. Western economic sanctions are a major deterrent that weighs heavily on 
entrepreneurs, but of equal importance are problems linked to rule of law. In February 
2019, US businessman Michael Calvey was detained on possibly dubious fraud charges; 
his arrest, described by Alexey Kudrin as an 'economic disaster', is a warning to foreign 
investors of the risks of operating on Russian markets. A survey led in May 2019 by 
Russian legal experts describes similarly negative conditions, with 69 % of respondents 
considering the country's business environment to be insecure (a higher percentage than 
in previous years). In absence of deeper structural reforms and with the ongoing 
pandemic crisis, Russia's long-term growth potential was estimated at 1.8 % by several 
think-tanks (far shorter than the Russian Economic Development Ministry's forecast of 3.3 
% by 2023), let alone the 7% annual average needed to meet Putin's target of a 50 % 
increase in GDP (Russel, 2019). 
Thus, lagging behind its main competitors, there is a long-term risk for Moscow to 
lose the resources battle against its competitors and fail to establish the needed influence 
or build up its armed forces, hindering its aspirations to act as a global superpower also in 
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